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Abstract - The Yemen’s independence was supported by the Chinese Government as a sovereign country with its territorial 
integrity and reunion. They Yemeni government firmly stood for the immediate restoration of China’s legitimacy as a 
member of the United Nations and as a sympathizer of the “One China” policy. The two friendly nations have been able to 
enjoy similarities in terms of their collective and individual views on the international and regional matters. There was a 
consistency in their individual understanding and support for each other. The main visits to Yemen by the Chinese officials 
were as follows: A Foreign Minister by name Qian Qichen in 1990. This was followed by the Vice-Chairman of the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Sai Funding in 1993. However, the next visit was by the Vice Premier 
Wu Bangguo in 1996 and 1997, respectively. Furthermore, another icon from the Chinse government to visit Yemen was 
Vice-Chairman of the Chinese National People’s  Congress Tomur Dawamat (2000). Yang Rudai was another official to 
visit Yemen fro China as the Chairman of the CPPCC in 2000. The Chief of the delegation from the Department of Foreign 
Relations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Li Chengwen in 2002. This was followed by the State 
Councillor by name Ismail Ahmed in 2003. Vice-premier of the State Council. Member of the Standing Committee of the 
Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee Huang Ju (2004), Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China Li 
Zhaoxing (2004), A senior official of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Wang Jiarui (2006), Chinese Vice President Xi 
Jinping (2008), Member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the 18th CPC Central Committee; Vice-Premier of 
the State Council Zhang Li Gao (2010), Member of the 18th CPC Central Committee; Minister of Public Security; State 
Councilor of State Council; Director of the National Anti-Terror Work Leading Group Guo Shengkun (2010). 
 




Ali Abdullah Saleh’s ability to remain in power in 
Yemen for so many years is a demonstration of his 
amazing ability. This is especially so after the 
formation of the Republic of Yemen that united the 
north with the south in 1990, and the various 
ceaseless domestic political troubles that threatened 
the new republic. In the south the separatist 
movement became more vitriolic, the Houthis in the 
north were restive, the Reform Party al-Qaeda was 
active in the oil-rich areas and many tribal affiliations 
were formed, and this made it much more difficult for 
the government of the day to govern Yemen 
(Schreiber, 2013). 
At that point in time, the Arab’s interest in the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) was due to their 
reliant upon the PRC for its political support as well 
as their national liberation movements. As such, the 
PRC gave South Yemen strong political and military 
backing in their fights against the colonial powers. 
On top of that, the PRC was also supportive of 
socialist parties in the Arabic countries and it includes 
the Iraqi Communist Party and the Southern Yemen 
Socialist Party. The PRC was also giving economic 
aid to many developing countries including the 
Arabic countries and Yemen was one of the 
recipients. The PRC was then prepared to grant the 
aid with the aim of enlarging its influence apropos to 
the Western powers and subsequently the Soviet 
Union (Huwaidin, 2008). 
On December 2002, Tang Jiaxuan, the Chinese 
Foreign Minister told his Yemeni counterpart at a 
meeting in Beijing that the PRC appreciates its time-
honored friendship with Yemen and is prepared to 
enhance its cooperation between them based on the 
principles of mutual respect, equality and reciprocal 
benefit in the new millennium.  He also highlighted 
the fact that among the Arabic countries, Yemen is 
one of the first to establish diplomatic relations with 
the PRC and their friendship and cooperation have 
grown steadily since diplomatic relations between 
them were established 46 years ago. He also said that 
both countries have, in recent years, cooperated 
effectively in areas involving politics, cultural 
activities, bilateral trade, healthcare and the economy. 
On top of that, both nations have always given 
support and cooperated with each other on matters 
involving international affairs. 
The Yemeni Foreign Minister, Abu Bakr Abdullah al-
Qirbi said Yemen appreciates its time-honored 
friendship with the PRC and it is a strong foundation 
for the development of bilateral relations between 
them. Yemen is also thankful to the PRC for 
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supporting it politically and for the economic 
assistance. Yemen places utmost importance on the 
friendly cooperation it has with the PRC and looks 
forward to further cooperation. He also praised the 
PRC for the effective bilateral cooperation in 
international affairs and appreciates the PRC’s for 
having envoys in the Middle East. Al-Qirbi also 
expressed his belief and hope that the PRC, being a 
permanent member of the United Nations’ Security 
Council will be able to play an effective role in the 
regional affairs of the Middle East. Al-Qirbi also said 
that both Yemen and the PRC share similar views on 
the issue of terrorism. As such Yemen is of the view 
that terrorism is a threat to the security and stability 
as well as the economic development of all countries. 
At the same time, he also called for a clear definition 
of terrorism and said that terrorism should not be 
confused with some nations just struggle for freedom. 
Tang explained the PRC’s position on the issues of 
anti-terrorism and reiterated that his country supports 
the fight against terrorism in whatever form, and that 
the United Nations together with its Security Council 
should assume the leading role to seek international 
cooperation to fight terrorism. He also said that the 
PRC is against associating terrorism with certain 
countries, nationalities or religions as well as 
instigating conflicts among the different cultures. 
Both countries also shared their views on issues 
affecting the Middle East and Iraq, and the PRC’s 
relations with the Arabic countries (Xinhua News 
Agency December 27, 2002). 
The Chinese ambassador to Yemen, Chang Hua,  said 
that both countries have cordial and friendly bilateral 
relations and both countries have expanded effort to 
improve cooperation in the fields of politics, 
economy, and society. He recalled with fondness that 
in September 1956, 58 years ago, Yemen was the 
third Arabic country to have diplomatic relations with 
the PRC.   
The PRC’s president, Xi Jinping, conveyed to 
Yemen’s president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, that both 
countries and its peoples have great traditional 
friendship and have a fairly well developed bilateral 
relations in all areas. At the same time, both countries 
are also supportive of each other on matters related to 
their respective core interests and major concerns. In 
spite of the ever-changing international situation, 
both countries have continued to have good brotherly 
relations. The PRC treats the development of 
cooperation with Yemen with utmost importance. It 
also respects Yemen as a sovereign and independent 
country and the way to develop the country that was 
chosen freely by its people. At the same time, the 
PRC also supports the current political development 
and economic reconstruction. The PRC has also 
expressed its willingness to have cordial exchanges 
with the Yemeni government, legislature, and 
political parties. It is also willing to share its 
experience in the administration of state affairs and 
political issues. It will also concentrate on bilateral 
cooperation in areas like electricity generation, oil 
and gas, communications, transportation and the 
construction of infrastructure. The PRC has also 
offered to help Yemen in many fields including 
sanitation, education, culture and sports.   
The PRC has encouraged its highly competent 
entrepreneurs to invest in Yemen and have advised 
the Yemeni government to create a conducive 
business environment for the investors and its 
personnel. It also supports Yemen’s fight against 
terrorism so as to enhance and protect its national 
security and is ready and keen to bolster bilateral 
cooperation in the fight against terrorism and piracy. 
At the same time, the PRC will continue to persuade 
and encourage the international community to give 
their support and assistance to Yemen (Hua, 2013). 
During his meeting with Yemeni leaders, Wang 
Jiarui, the CPC Central Committee’s head of the 
International Department, conveyed the PRC’s 
appreciation to the Yemeni leaders for their 
unswerving and reliable support of the PRC on the 
issues involving Taiwan, Tibet, and human rights. He 
also said that Yemen is a dependable friend and hope 
that President Saleh’s forthcoming trip to the PRC in 
April 2006 will be a fruitful one. Saleh reassured 
Wang on Yemen’s adherence of the one-China policy 
and said that Taiwan’s reunification with the PRC is 
an unalterable trend. He also expressed his gratitude 
to the PRC and its people for their long-lasting 
support and assistance to his country (Lei, 2006). 
On April 6, 2006, the president of the PRC, Hu 
Jintao, had a meeting with President Saleh of Yemen 
in Beijing and their talks were candid, in-depth and 
fruitful. Hu spoke of Yemen’s 50-year-old diplomatic 
ties with the PRC, the strong bilateral relations that 
have withstood the test of time and the changing 
international political climate, and it has also become 
stronger. Hu also expressed his appreciation of 
Yemen’s adherence of the one-China policy and 
support of the reunification of Taiwan with the PRC. 
Hu also said that their friendship has grown in spite 
of difficult international political situations and they 
can rely on each other. They have also enhanced 
dialogue and exchanges at all levels as well as 
increased mutual political trust. Saleh noted that from 
the time diplomatic ties were established 50 years 
ago, the Yemeni people have had deep friendly 
feelings towards the citizens of the PRC. He stressed 
that his country will hold on firmly to the one-China 
policy and will continue to support the reunification 
of Taiwan with the PRC (Jintao & Saleh, 2006). 
On the last leg of his tour of five Asian nations, the 
then vice-president of the PRC, Xi Jinping made an 
official visit to Yemen on June 24, 2008, and met 
with President Saleh. In the statement issued by the 
PRC authorities at the airport, Xi said that the PRC 
and Yemen have all-round cooperation and since the 
establishment of diplomatic ties between them 52 
years ago they have continued to enhance political 
trust, advance trade, and economic cooperation and 
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have made closer cultural exchanges. He reiterated 
that Yemen’s relations with the PRC is important and 
he will continue to strengthen their friendship and 
enhance mutually beneficial cooperation. Xi also said 
that he believes that his visit will continue to enhance 
the two countries friendship with each other and that 
of its people and this will in turn help to advance 
bilateral relations. At the meeting, Xi said that the 
PRC is ready to enlarge mutually beneficial 
cooperation with Yemen as it will also invigorate 
their traditional friendly and cooperative relations. 
Both leaders also pledged to look for new 
opportunities for bilateral cooperation. Xi also said 
that their relations have not diminished, but it has 
instead continued to grow in spite of the 
everchanging global political situation. Both nations 
have developed mutual trust, support and cooperation 
with each other and their friendship have grown 
stronger. Xi further thanked Yemen for being a long-
term supporter of China on issues involving Taiwan 
and pledged that the PRC will always give its support 
to Yemen in its endeavor to safeguard its unification, 
sovereignty and stability. 
 President Saleh said that Yemen has similar 
aspirations as the PRC to strengthen their mutual 
cooperation in all fields and emphasized that his 
country will continue to give strong support for the 
PRC’s reunification ambitions (Xuequan, 2008). 
In 2010, at a meeting with the delegation of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) from Guangxi 
Zhuang Autonomous Region when they visited 
Yemen, Yemen’s Vice President Abdu Rabo 
Mansour Hadi stressed that Yemen support the PRC’s 
unity and Taiwan’s return to its motherland. The 
Chinese delegation was led by its secretary, Guo 
Shengkun. Hadi reviewed a few topics and issues 
about Yemeni-Chinese relations with the Chinese 
delegation. He specifically mentioned that the 
Yemenis are grateful to the PRC for its assistance to 
Yemen during the Yemeni revolution in September 
and October of 1962-63  especially through the Aden-
Hadramout road and Hodeidah-Sana’a road. Apart 
from the aforesaid aid the PRC also provided many 
other aids including political support to enhance the 
stability, security and unity of Yemen. Hadi also said 
that, “We in Yemen, are very happy for the 
developments and giant achievements made by China 
at various levels.” On its part, the delegation from 
Guangxi Zhuang expressed its appreciation of 
Yemen’s high level and long term friendship with the 
PRC as well as Yemen’s support of China’s policy of 
restoring its lands at the international level (Saba 
news 10.10.2010). 
 
II. THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND 
A UNIFIED YEMEN IN 1990 
 
Yemen, which is politically and economically 
important, is a large country that is strategically 
located at the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula 
and has common borders with Saudi Arabia, Oman, 
the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden (Terrill, 2011). It 
was divided into North Yemen formally known as the 
Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and South Yemen 
formally known as the People’s Republic of Yemen 
(PDRY) with the former being supported by the 
United States (US) and the latter by the Soviet Union. 
The division ended when both of them united to form 
the Republic of Yemen (RY) on May 22, 1990. In the 
period prior to September 1962 northern part of 
Yemen was ruled by the Imamat regime whereas 
most of the southern portion was under British 
control. 
The Chinese ambassador to Yemen, Chang, 
reaffirmed the PRC’s support for the unity, security 
and stability of Yemen (Hua, 2013). Concurrently, 
the US ambassador to Yemen, Stephen Seche, said 
that the US is always supportive of a Yemen that is 
united, stable and democratic. He also said that a 
united Yemen is important because it can enhance the 
security and stability of the region (Dammag, 2014). 
Apparently, the rapid successive events that led to the 
formation of the Republic of Yemen in 1990 nuisance 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) by surprise, 
Yemenis have chosen to be a democratic country in 
the Arab peninsula. The KSA felt that a united 
Yemen would be the biggest threat to the kingdom 
and wanted Yemen to be divided into two or more 
parts, but this was resolved by subsequent events 
especially the end of the Cold War (Burke, 2012). 
Upon the formation of the Republic of Yemen (RY), 
Sana’a became its chosen political capital and Aden 
its economic capital. The PRC was one of the first 
countries to give recognition to the new republic. 
The then PRC president, Yang Shangkun, sent a 
congratulatory note to President Saleh, Chairman of 
the Presidential Council of the Republic of Yemen, 
one day after the new republic was proclaimed. In the 
note, President Yang, congratulated President Saleh 
and all Yemenis on the occasion of the formation of 
the new republic. He also congratulated the Yemeni 
leaders who have managed to unite Yemen, an event 
of great historical significance, through countless 
friendly consultations. He also touched upon the 
PRC’s good relations and cooperation with North and 
South Yemen and it has always supported its unity, 
stability, and peace. He added that the Chinese 
government and its people respect the choice of the 
Yemeni people and hope that the historical 
unification helps the development of Yemen as well 
as contribute to the peace and stability of the region. 
He ended his congratulatory note with “We wish the 
Republic of Yemen prosperity and its people 
happiness. May China-Yemeni relations of friendship 
and co-operation continuously consolidate and 
develop.” (Binhuwaidin, 2001).   
 
In 2002 Tang Jiaxuan, the Chinese Foreign Minister, 
said that the PRC are ardent admirers of the efforts 
Yemeni leaders and its government have made to 
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develop Sino-Yemeni relations. Tang also thanked 
Yemen for their steadfast adherence of the one-China 
policy as well as its support of China’s stand on 
human right issues. He reiterated that China supports 
the unification of Yemen and its endeavor to maintain 
independence and territorial integrity. (Xinhua News 
Agency December 27, 2002). 
 
The PRC supported Yemen’s unification because it 
was concerned with the increasing influence the 
Soviet Union and the US had made in the region. The 
PRC was of the opinion that a divided Yemen will 
attract foreign interventions in Yemen, in particular, 
the Soviet Union and the US. Only a united Yemen 
will reduce or stop foreign intervention and as such 
the PRC continued to focus on Yemen’s domestic 
developments especially after the power struggle 
between the different parties in early 1994. 
 
When the PRC delegation led by Huang Yicheng, the 
Minister of Energy Resources, went to Yemen to join 
in the celebration of the RY’s first anniversary, 
President Saleh told the delegation that he appreciates 
the PRC’s support of Yemen’s reunification and the 
assistance that the RY has received from the PRC for 
its economic development. When President Saleh 
visited the PRC on February 14, 1998, he took the 
opportunity to express to the PRC his profound 
appreciation for their strong support of Arab rights 
and the Yemenis’ revolution, unity and development 
efforts. 
 
On the same date, Chinese president Jiang Zemin 
expressed his country's thanks to the Yemeni 
government for the supportive political attitude 
towards China on many issues such as adhering to the 
concept (One China) by refraining from establishing 
any kind of formal relations, or technical 
Cooperation, economic and trade with Taiwan, as 
well as supporting China in the issues associated with 
human rights. The president of China concluded his 
statement saying that the Chinese leadership highly 
values the internal and external Yemeni politics, 
adding that Achieve unity of Yemen is a blank page 
in the history of Yemen and that the development and 
stability of Yemen serve peace and stability in the 
Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea (Ubaid, 2003) 
From the mid-1990s until the end of the second 
millennium, the PRC officials continued to praise 
Yemen’s foreign policy especially its peaceful, 
neutral and good-neighborly foreign policies as well 
as its efforts to strengthen its relations with 
neighboring countries and other Arab states. The PRC 
is of the opinion that Yemen can be a major force to 
maintain the Arab states’ solidarity and peace and 
stability of both the Red Sea and the Gulf area 
(Binhuwaidin, 2001). 
There was an indication of China's positive attitudes 
towards Yemen in international organizations. That is 
especially the position of the Yemeni unity and also 
in 1994 during the war of secession. This was as a 
result of several reasons. First, China-related with the 
Yemeni people. But China was not with the 
government, the politicians, despite the fact that the 
Yemeni people wanted a national unity and 
continuity. Second, China is a permanent member of 
the UN Security Council and has internal problems in 
Tibet, Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang these areas calling 
for secession. In addition to the Taiwan issue 
affecting national security, China has always been in 
the international positions to favor unity, a stability of 
States, but rejects the issue of secession, internal 
rebellions, and others. Third, China emphasizes the 
issue of unity because it does not want to be recorded 
in the Security Council and the United Nations, 
international precedent. Similarly,  Russia supports 
the unity, because it has internal problems of 
Chechnya and Crimea. China and Russia supported 
the unity and rejects separation. This is due to the 
stems from their internal politics for two countries. 
(Al-Muaalemi, interview,  2016). 
 
On the same issue, Jalal  Ibrahim Fakirah (Interview, 
May 23, 2016) argued that China is among the 
countries which suffered from the ravages of 
cleavage and scattered and retail. For example, the  
West Germany, East Germany and like the two 
Koreas. That is why any unitary project China tends 
to be in support. She believes any position in the 
framework of the unity integrationist projects in any 
unit from the units in the international system or sub-
systems. This tends to reflect them by some way or 
another over extend support across the world with its 
Unionist Project in its relations with Taiwan. China is 
still calling on Taiwan, in a more international 
conference and trying to restore unity with  Taiwan. 
China distinguished relations with western  Taiwan 
model. This affected their political, economic, and 
political life. But the major powers and great powers 
to prevent this Unionist Project in order to blackmail 
China. Therefore, China's support for Yemeni unity 
stems from the domestic and foreign policies for 
China, specifically based on the Taiwan issue 
(Fakirah, Interview,  2016). 
 
2.1 The impact of the First Gulf War (1990-91) 
The political upheavals that occurred in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s resulted in the end of communist rule 
in many Central and Eastern European countries as 
well as Central Asian countries. The Berlin Wall was 
dismantled, the Solidarity Party won the election in 
Poland and the Velvet Revolution started in 
Czechoslovakia and these were some of the events 
that initiated the rise of young and unexperienced 
liberal democracies in many of the former communist 
states. In relations to the aforementioned events in 
Europe and Central Asia, when the First Gulf War 
occurred is a more important factor to explain the US 
strategy for the setting up of the Gulf coalition.  
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When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, East and West 
Germany were reunited. In the early 1990s, the Soviet 
Union had lost control of its satellite states. In August 
1991, an attempted coup was carried out against 
President Gorbachev by communist hard-liners and 
before the year was over Gorbachev had resigned and 
the Soviet Union ceased to exist. The new states 
which were formerly communist sought to have 
closer ties with the West, in particular the US. A few 
of them (including Poland and Czechoslovakia) were 
involved in the First Gulf War, whilst most of them 
were too busy trying to resolve transition issues 
(McCabe, 2010). 
Kuwait attempted to keep Iraq’s power in check by 
extracting more oil to flood the market and thereby 
force the price of oil down. The Kuwaiti action, 
together with several other factors, provoked Saddam 
Hussein to retaliate and on August 2, 1990 he invaded 
Kuwait with a force of one hundred thousand troops. 
The US State Department stressed that its desire was 
to ensure that oil can passed freely through the Strait 
of Hormuz and this clearly reflects that the US 
interest in the affair is clearly linked to oil. The US, 
being highly dependent on oil, feared that Saddam 
was gaining too much control over the oil resources 
of the Middle East. The US was of the opinion that it 
had to intervene, otherwise Saddam will invade Saudi 
Arabia and effectively one-fifth of the world’s oil 
production together with one-third of the world’s oil 
reserves will be under his control (Keleher, 2012). 
The common objective of Kuwait’s allies during the 
First Gulf War was to drive Iraq out of Kuwait’s 
territorial boundaries. The invasion of Kuwait by 
Saddam and his threats to the Saudi oilfields was not 
only a threat to the countries involved in the conflict 
for it was also a threat to the regional neighbors and 
beyond. The US was very concerned that if Iraq were 
to annex the oil fields, then the US national interest 
will be seriously affected and may disrupt the 
transport of oil from the Middle East. Shortly after 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the UN, by virtue of 
Resolution 660, condemned Iraq for invading Kuwait 
and also demanded that it withdraw all its troops 
(McCabe, 2010). 
The First Gulf War was the first war that was fought 
over a vital natural resource and the US moved from 
a position of insecurity to a position that dominates 
the international oil market. They can invade other 
countries and claim that it is to defend weaker 
countries or to fight tyranny or terrorism. These 
appealing but vague values can be used to hide an 
ulterior plan, so instead of directly dominating 
another country some countries were able to secure, 
in an indirect way, access to particular commodities 
by using strong-arm tactics in order to preserve a 
certain set of economic conditions abroad (Keleher, 
2012).   
The First Gulf War that began on August 2, 1990 will 
go down in modern Arab history as one of the most 
significant event that has ever happened in the region. 
On that day Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait and wreaked 
massive destruction in the comparatively small 
nation. Subsequently, Iraq was defeated by the US-
led allied forces and the era of the Gulf countries 
being protected by the US began. The Gulf states 
were colonized in the shape of foreign armies and 
navies, a phenomenon that last occurred in the Arab 
region in the eighteenth century when Portugal 
invaded some of the countries in the region. 
Yemen was unfortunate to have been the only Arab 
country to sit on the UN’s Security Council when 
Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. Yemen did not support 
the UN resolution that called for military action to be 
taken against Iraq so that Kuwait can regain its 
sovereignty. President Saleh, a known admirer of 
Saddam, was in favor of a strong alliance with Iraq 
and opted to use a “regional solution” to resolve the 
conflict. The timing of the conflict was disastrous for 
Yemen as at that point in time it was struggling to 
stabilize its currency due to the fact that when Yemen 
was unified the south was virtually bankrupt. The 
Gulf states immediately stopped giving financial aid 
to Yemen, 800,000 Yemeni immigrants were asked to 
leave Saudi Arabia and Kuwait expelled a few 
thousands. It was a severe blow to Yemen’s economy 
and it has yet to recover from it (Burke, 2012). 
At the beginning of the unification of south and north 
Yemen and also the Gulf crisis in 1990, deteriorating 
relations between Yemen, the Gulf States, and the 
Western camp, especially America is seen.  It is one 
of the reasons why Yemen at that point is keen on 
building its relationship with China, by checking not 
to be the prey of international pressure, 
authoritarianism, international isolation and 
domination of western quarters, but for Yemen, to be 
breathing space with China (Fakirah, interview, 
2016). 
As the First Gulf War is a complicated incident, this 
researcher will not discuss it in detail in this thesis. 
However, the aforesaid war is important because as a 
result of the war Yemen’s relation with the PRC is 
affected. As such this research is divided into three 
sections. The first one is on Yemen’s position vis-à-
vis the Gulf war, the second one is on China’s 
position vis-à-vis the Gulf war and the third one is the 
effect of the first two positions on the Yemen-PRC 
relations. 
 
2.2 The Republic of Yemen’s  stance towards the 
First Gulf War (1990-91) 
The crisis in Kuwait occurred when Iraq invaded and 
occupied Kuwait on August 2, 1990. World-wide 
condemnation of Iraq immediately followed Iraq’s 
action. The UN Security Council issued a series of 
resolutions that called for Iraq to make an immediate 
and unconditional withdrawal of all its troops from 
Kuwait, and the imposition of economic sanctions 
against Iraq. The Arab countries together with the 
international community tried to bring about a 
peaceful end to the crisis so as to avoid a disastrous 
International Journal of Management and Applied Science, ISSN: 2394-7926                                                 Volume-3, Issue-3, Mar.-2017 
http://iraj.in 
The Political Relations Between Yemen and the People’s Republic of China during Ali Abdullah Saleh’s Administration from 1990 to 2012 
 
21 
war. Meanwhile, on August 7, 1990 the US started 
“Operation Desert Storm” and sent troops to the Gulf 
region. However, Iraq was adamant and refuse to 
comply with the Security Council’s resolutions and 
also refused to accept the peaceful solutions (De 
Silva, 2014). 
Subsequently, the UN Security Council Resolution 
678 was adopted whereby member states were 
authorized “to use all necessary means” which 
includes the use of military force to ensure that Iraq 
complies with all previous resolutions issued by the 
Security Council unless Iraqi military forces are 
withdrawn from Kuwait not later than January 15, 
1991. However, Iraq was adamant and refused to 
withdraw its military forces from Kuwait (Freedman 
et al. 1993). As a result, a US-led coalition pounded 
the Iraqi troops in Kuwait and Iraq from the air and 
this was followed by the entry of ground troops into 
Kuwait (Cohen & Sultan, 1995). The Iraqi troops 
were forced to withdraw from Kuwait and Kuwait’s 
independence, sovereignty and legitimate government 
were restored. After the liberation, the UN continued 
to maintain the sanctions against Iraq and limit its 
military capability. The Presidential Council and the 
cabinet of Yemen jointly issued a statement and 
called upon the international community, particularly 
the permanent members of the UN Security Council, 
to take on the task of ending the war and to realize 
peace (Xiaodong, 1991). 
The statement stressed on the fact that Yemen 
respects the principles contained in the UN’s Charter 
as well as the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
independence of individual states. Yemen’s principle 
is to condemn all types of foreign interference of 
other states’ internal affairs, oppose the use of force 
and settle all disputes in a peaceful manner. Based on 
the aforementioned principles, Yemen encouraged 
Iraq and Kuwait to start negotiations immediately and 
was a strong supporter of individual or collective 
efforts made by the Arab states to resolve the conflict. 
On top of that, it came at a time when the relations 
between Iraq and Kuwait was at its weakest point 
when in July 1990, Iraq accused Kuwait and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) of they did not pay 
compensation to Saddam during his war against Iran 
by proxy instead of Gulf countries. When the 
economic war was declared by the oil-rich Arab 
states (according to OPEC agreements), oil prices 
plunged.  As a result Iraq lost billions of dollars 
annually during the period of 1987 to 1990. The 
invasion event terminated with the membership of 
Yemen in the Security Council on behalf of the Arab 
Group (Barja, 2002 & Dammag, 2005). 
When the UN Security Council voted for the adoption 
of Resolution 660, Yemen’s representative to the 
council was absent. The resolution was adopted by a 
majority of 14 votes with no objections. The 
aforesaid resolution condemned Iraq for invading and 
occupying Kuwait and demanded Iraq to withdraw its 
forces forthwith. Yemen’s representative was not 
present during the deliberation of the resolution and 
its voting. His reason for his action was not he was 
not instructed by Sana’a on what position to take, but 
his justification was not accepted by the US and the 
Gulf states. 
However, the Yemeni government insisted that their 
position on the matter were misunderstood by others 
as they were in favor of resolving the problem of the 
Iraqi invasion through dialogue and other peaceful 
solutions within the framework of the brotherly 
Arabic states. Yemen disagrees with the use of force 
in the region and in fact President Saleh made an 
emergency trip to Baghdad one day after Iraq invaded 
Kuwait. It was said that Iraq was agreeable with the 
Arab solutions and had already decided to withdraw 
its troops. In addition to that, President Saleh visited 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt after his trip to Iraq and this 
confirms Yemen’s call for the resolution of the 
problem within the Arabic framework and free from 
foreign interference. 
Yemen’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a report 
on February 13, 1991 which declared that Yemen’s 
position is that it rejects Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait 
and demands its withdrawal. Yemen also rejects 
foreign military intervention in the region, insisted 
that a peaceful regional solution should be used and 
denounced the US-led allied forces attack of Iraq and 
the destruction of its military and civilian 
infrastructure. Yemen is also in favor of a 
comprehensive review of all regional conflicts and 
supports Iraq’s initiative of August 12, 1990 to reject 
the international powers use of double-standards 
when dealing with issues in the Middle East. (Lynch, 
2011). 
During the Kuwait crisis, a special envoy from 
Yemen went to the PRC with the intention to gather 
support from the PRC to halt the US-led military 
offensive against Iraq. The Yemeni Minister of State 
for Parliamentary Affairs, Rashid Mohammed 
Thabet, had a meeting with Vice Premier Wu 
Xueqian. At the meeting, Rashid Mohammed Thabet 
handed a letter from President Saleh to President 
Yang Shangkun through Wu. He also briefed Wu on 
Yemen’s position on the Gulf crisis and its endeavors 
to end the war peacefully in the shortest possible 
time. During the crisis, the PRC and Yemen were 
busy advocating the need to end the war and to seek 
for a political solution to end the crisis. However, the 
Chinese government, unlike the Yemeni government, 
was reluctant to challenge the Western powers on the 
issue (Binhuwaidin, 2001). 
Yemen’s position on the crisis was generally 
unfavorable to the West, but it was particularly 
unfavorable to the Gulf states and they felt that 
Yemen was partial or bias. The Gulf states the main 
argument against Yemen was its failure to condemn 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait not just once but on three 
separate occasions. The first time was when Yemen’s 
representative to the UN was not present when the 
Security Council was debating Iraq’s invasion of 
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Kuwait. On the second occasion, the Yemeni 
delegates did not agree with the Arab Foreign 
Ministers’ statement in Cairo on August 2, 1990. On 
the third occasion, Yemen rejected the resolution 
issued at the Cairo Summit. To summarize, the 
Yemen’s stances were as follows; its representative 
has not shown up to vote for once, however, voted for 
the resolution for six times and voted against the 
resolution twice and abstained five times. 
Yemen’s position on the First Gulf War brought 
about negative impacts at both the internal and 
external levels. Its economy was badly affected when 
Saudi Arabia kicked out almost 1 million Yemenis 
working there and it turned into catastrophic social 
problem because such a gigantic number of Yemenis 
have lost their only means of livelihood. It also 
resulted in the collapse of the Yemeni economy 
because the money that the Yemenis were remitting 
home from Saudi Arabia which was one of the pillars 
of its economy immediately dried up. The 
unemployment rate in the country rose by 35%. 
Secondly, the per capita income of Yemen dropped to 
USD 250 per annum and large sections of the 
community fell below the poverty line. 
In short, the external effects of the First Gulf 
War was the Gulf states immediately stopped the 
financial support of development projects in Yemen 
and the US and Europe also stopped sending aids to 
Yemen. On the political front, Yemen’s relations with 
its neighbors deteriorated rapidly until ties were 
severed. The Gulf states also rejected Yemen’s 
application to join the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) because of Yemen’s position on the Gulf 
crisis. If truth be told, some of the Gulf states 
supported the separatist in Yemen during its civil 
war. On top of that, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
provided funds and weapons to some parties in 
Yemen in their efforts to destabilize Yemen and 
prevent its unification. 
 
2.3 The People’s Republic of China’s  stance 
towards the First Gulf War (1990-91) 
During the First Gulf War, the PRC was against Iraq 
invading Kuwait and as a result, many Arab states 
treated the PRC as an important ally. The PRC’s 
support of the Arab states’ policy to restore 
independence to Kuwait gave it legitimacy and was 
crucial as the PRC is a permanent member of the UN 
Security Council. During this period, the PRC acted 
responsibly and actively sought to preserve 
international peace and security. In fact, it supported 
the Security Council’s Resolution 678 that demanded 
Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and granted authority 
to the international coalition to use their military 
forces to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. In terms of 
China-Arab relations, the First Gulf War is an 
indication of the strategic political and military role 
the PRC is capable of to influence Arab conflicts and 
the peace and security in the Middle East (Huwaidin, 
2008). 
To the PRC, Iraq, and Kuwait are important in the 
Gulf region due to the following reasons: 
1. The PRC’s mission to implement its 
modernization programs requires a world that is 
stable and it would include the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region. The PRC is heavily dependent 
upon the vigor of the Western and Asian 
economies to support its economic 
modernization and this would include foreign 
capital and technology. Even though it was not 
considered to be a major importer of Gulf oil, the 
PRC was apprehensive about the impact of an oil 
crisis and the ensuing impact on its economy. 
2. Before the crisis, the PRC’s trade with the states 
within the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region 
had increased substantially. In 1989, slightly 
more than a quarter of its total volume of trade in 
the region came from Kuwait and Iraq. Among 
the Gulf States, the PRC’s biggest trade partner 
was the UAE, followed by Saudi Arabia and then 
Kuwait. The PRC’s total trade volume with the 
countries in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula 
region hit USD 5,074 million from 1985 to 1989 
and Kuwait alone accounted for USD 719 
million. Since 1985, the PRC’s trade volume 
with Kuwait was most remarkable as it has 
increased almost every year. In addition to that, 
the PRC’s exports to Kuwait and Iraq are more 
than what it imports from them, and this has 
provided the PRC with the essential hard 
currency. 
3. Iraq provided many Chinese companies with 
investment opportunities and many Chinese 
workers also profited from the reconstruction 
work of Iraqi infrastructures that were damaged 
during the Iraq-Iran war. According to  Shichor, 
more than 50% of the PRC’s labor exports went 
to Iraq and by 1987 it was worth USD 678 
million, The total construction services the PRC 
supplied to Iraq from 1976 to 1987 was worth 
more than USD 1 billion (Shichor, 2006). 
4. Iraq was one of the largest purchasers of arms 
from the PRC in the 1980s and thus was a good 
source of much-needed hard currency to the 
PRC.  
5. About 7,700 Chinese construction workers were 
employed in Kuwait and prior to the crisis, the 
value of Chinese labor service contracts with 
Kuwait was almost USD 500 million. (Mouhong, 
1990). Kuwait was a provider of soft loans for 
many of the PRC’s development projects and in 
fact, from 1982 to 1989 the PRC obtained the 
said loans for 13 projects in its various provinces. 
The soft loans amounted to USD 310 million and 
were provided by the Kuwait Fund for Arab 
Economic Development (Shichor, 1992). 
 
On August 28 1990, Premier Li Peng reported to the 
15th Session of the Standard Committee of the 
Seventh National People’s Congress that the PRC is 
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strongly opposed to the Iraqi invasion and annexation 
of Kuwait as well as the involvement of the US-led 
allied forces. He stressed that the PRC supports the 
view that the Iraq-Kuwait dispute should be settled by 
using peaceful methods within the Arab countries as 
well as using the UN as a mediator (Mouhong, 1990).   
This position is a reflection of the PRC’s foreign 
policy principles that the “Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence” should be used as the basis for state-to-
state relations and that differences between them 
should be resolved peacefully and not through the use 
of force. As such the Chinese government was 
against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and advocated that 
Kuwait’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
government’s legitimacy should be restored 
peacefully. The Chinese government assured Emir 
Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah of Kuwait, who visited the 
PRC in December, 1990, that the PRC’s “principled 
stand” against Iraq’s invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait is unchangeable (Haibo, 1991). The PRC 
voted for every UN Security Council resolutions on 
Iraq but abstained from voting on Resolution 678 
which gave legitimacy for the use of force to drive 
Iraqi troops out of Kuwait.    
 
The Chinese government’s decision to support or at 
least not to oppose the UN Security Council’s 
resolutions with regards to the crisis is probably due 
to the following reasons: 
1. The Gulf crisis was a golden opportunity for the 
Chinese government to repair its international 
reputation and remove the economic and political 
sanctions it was under following the infamous 
Tiananmen incident in the summer of 1989. The 
most important reason is probably because the 
Chinese government seized the opportunity to 
react favorably so as to enhance its bilateral 
relationship with the US that was damaged in the 
aftermath of the Tiananmen incident. The PRC’s 
objective was to attract foreign direct 
investments, capital and technology from the 
West and Japan as they were needed for the 
continuance of its modernization program. The 
Chinese government realized that foreign direct 
investments, capital, and technology are far more 
important for the development of the country 
than its USD 2 billion arms export to Iraq 
(Huwaidin, 2001). As a result, following its 
conduct on the Security Council’s resolutions on 
Iraq, the US restarted its high-level meetings 
with the PRC and took the lead to remove its 
economic sanctions and this resulted in Europe, 
Japan and South-east Asia following in the 
footsteps of the US. 
2. The PRC, keeping in mind the risk to its own 
modernization drive, was concerned about the 
negative effects of the crisis on international 
economic relations and its own need for oil in the 
future.  
3. The PRC was not willing to hurt the improving 
relations it had with the Gulf countries for they 
did not join the other countries that condemned 
the actions carried out by the Chinese 
government during the Tiananmen incident or 
the country’s violation of human rights. 
Therefore, to safeguard and also expand its 
relations with the Gulf countries and to prevent 
them from favoring the Republic of China 
(ROC), the PRC was left with only one choice, 
i.e. to cooperate. 
 
In January 1991, after the outbreak of the First Gulf 
War, the Chinese government continued to highlight 
its stance about the war, i.e. it opposes the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait and Iraq must make an immediate 
withdrawal from Kuwait. In the meantime, it 
continuously advocated the need to use political and 
diplomatic means to find a peaceful solution to 
resolve the crisis and to avoid the use of force. This 
policy of the Chinese government arises from the 
following rationales: 
1. The PRC wanted to be a strong and leading 
advocate for the Third World and sought to stay 
far away from the regional military defeat. It had 
ambitions to take on a positive role to resolving 
the crisis and in order to achieve it the Chinese 
government has: (1) received the First Deputy 
Premier of Iraq, Taha Yasin Ramadan on 
September 6, 1990; and (2) dispatched its 
Foreign Minister to almost all the Arab capitals 
including Iraq to explore the “possibility of a 
peaceful solution of the worsening Gulf crisis” 
(Yanhui, 1990 & Huwaidin, 2001).   
2. Saddam Hussein’s defeat by the US-led coalition 
forces may result in the Gulf region adopting 
US-led security system and the PRC may lose its 
position as one of the largest supplier of arms to 
the region. 
3. The PRC has always been very sensitive on the 
matter of the usage of force against a sovereign 
state. The PRC always stress on the importance 
of using the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence to conduct relations among 
countries because it is mainly driven its own 
issue of reuniting Taiwan with the motherland as 
well as its policies on how to resolve the issues 
in some of the unstable regions within its own 
borders. Therefore, the PRC has always held on 
to these policies in international relations 
because of its own ambitions. The Chinese 
foreign minister said that his country, in 
principle, does not agree with military 
intervention by the major powers in the Persian 
Gulf.  He said that the PRC is of the view that it 
has been proven by history that if military power 
is used as a basis of a world order and nations are 
being threatened by force, then it is not reliable. 
But, if the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence is used as a basis then only can the 
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world order continue to be vital. He added that 
the occurrence of the Gulf crisis is because of the 
violation of these principles (Qichen, 1990).  
 
This time the PRC was also concerned about the war 
spilling over and expanding into the Gulf region and 
the Arabian Peninsula and after that all over the 
Middle East. This concern can be found in Premier Li 
Peng’s statement.  The PRC and its people made a 
strong appeal to all the concerned parties to exercise 
great self-control to prevent the war from escalating 
and expanding as this will protect the countries in the 
Middle East and its people from a greater catastrophe. 
It will also give rise to favorable conditions and 
provide opportunities to enable the international 
community to search for a peaceful solution to settle 
the conflict (Xiaodong, 1991). 
 
On February 24, 1991, the US-led ground troops 
moved into Kuwait. On the same day, the Chinese 
government, through its own initiative to seek a 
peaceful end to the crisis so as to allow itself to 
continue being involved with the Gulf region’s 
development, made a six-point proposal to resolve the 
crisis peacefully. The six points in the proposal are: 
1. The unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops 
from Kuwait:  
2. The parties concerned should exhibit their 
willingness for peace;  
3. The immediate task is to prevent the expansion 
and escalation of the war and the creation of 
favorable conditions for the implementation of 
peaceful efforts. All parties concerned with the 
conflict must do their best not to take any actions 
that can result in more deaths or destroy civilian 
installations;  
4. All concerns related to the Gulf region’s security 
after the end of the current conflict should 
primarily be consulted with and solved by the 
regional countries. The foreign troops should pull 
out from the region and the regions Arabic and 
Islamic nations should take on a more important 
role; 
5. On the issue of the Middle East, it is virtually 
impossible to have a real and permanent peace in 
the Gulf region and the Middle East if no 
solution is found to resolve the conflict between 
Israel and the Arab countries. As such, the 
international community should concentrate on 
finding a peaceful solution to end the conflict; 
and  
6. The above-mentioned five issues may not be 
inter-linked, but they can be handled one after 
another. However, equal consideration and 
attention must be given to resolve all the five 
issues (Jiechi, 1991). 
 
This Chinese proposal together with their other 
efforts to resolve the crisis peacefully shows that the 
PRC was worried about the on-going military actions 
in the Gulf region and the unending US-led attack on 
Iraq. It is the reason why the PRC was pleased when 
the military operations against Iraq was suspended in 
March 1991.  
After Iraqi troops withdrew from Kuwait and military 
operations were suspended, the Chinese assistant 
foreign minister, Yang Facheng, spoke about the 
PRC’s policy on the new arrangements. Yang 
emphasized that his country’s stand is the affairs of 
the Gulf region must be led and dealt with through 
dialogue by the countries in the region. He also 
emphasized that every nation must respect the 
sovereignty, independence and security of the Gulf 
countries and not interfere in their internal affairs. He 
added that the Gulf countries must handle the issues 
themselves and that the Security Council can also 
contribute by playing a positive role. He also said that 
the PRC supports the Gulf countries on “bolstering 
their unity and strengthening themselves to maintain 
peace and stability” in the region. He also said that 
the PRC understands and respects the defense 
procedures the Gulf countries have adopted for their 
own security (Huwaidin, 2001).  
The PRC had three options. Firstly, the PRC can side 
with Iraq in the conflict and exercise its right to veto 
in the Security Council. However, it would have 
angered the Western powers, especially the US, 
which had gathered unprecedented global cooperation 
on an issue that almost all countries agree. On top of 
that, the PRC would have distanced itself from many 
Arab countries which are frightened of Iraq growing 
aggression.  The second option was for the PRC to 
vote for the US-backed resolution, but that would be 
a direct contradiction of the PRC’s well-articulated 
principle of not using force. On top of that, the PRC 
was not comfortable to be associated with the 
objectives of former colonialist powers. Its fear was 
that if it were to share the same bed with historically 
strange bedfellows its reputation would be sullied, 
especially in the Middle East, as it is the one and only 
permanent representative from the Third World in the 
UNSC (Shichor, 2005). As the first two options were 
fraught with disadvantages, the PRC chose to abstain 
from voting. The final result of the vote was twelve 
members voted in favor, two members (Cuba and 
Yemen) voted against and the PRC abstained. 
In short, for the PRC to follow the international 
norms during the Kuwaiti crisis and after it ended 
indicates that it is concerned about the stability of the 
regions as it can help to protect its own 
modernization. It means that the Chinese agree with 
the principle that development can only be attained if 
there is stability in one of the most important regions 
of the world. The stability of the Gulf region and the 
Arabian Peninsula is important for China to 
modernize its economy and thus support or even 
increase its capabilities when compared to others. The 
PRC’s actions in the 1990s were completely different 
from the past as it is no longer preoccupied with 
criticizing the US presence in the region. Its new 
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focus was the maintenance of stability in the region 
as well as to prevent any hostile country to dominate 
the region. 
 
2.4 The influence of the Yemeni-China stance 
towards the First Gulf War (1990-91) on bilateral 
relations 
Some scholars, including Lillian Craig Harris, 
contend that the Gulf crisis was very harmful to the 
PRC’s long-term interests. From the start, the PRC 
incurred economic losses amounting to 2 to 3 billion 
dollars and it was from the loss of profits and 
properties of 60 Iraqi and Kuwaiti-based Chinese 
companies and a USD 300 million development loan 
from Kuwait of which only half of it has been 
delivered. On top of that, Iraq still owes the PRC a 
large amount of money whereby payment has been 
frozen and the war caused the stoppage, in both 
countries, several major development projects. The 
PRC also had to evacuate about 10,000 workers from 
the two countries via Jordan (Harris, 1991). 
Harris was also of the opinion that as a result of the 
war the PRC suffered major diplomatic losses, 
especially in relations to the Middle Eastern regimes. 
In spite of the PRC’s abstention when Resolution 678 
was put to the vote, Harris contends that the 
aforementioned were not fooled by the clever 
politicking of the PRC. On the other hand, the PRC 
was at risk of being perceived as another bully using 
economic and technical aid to control the Middle 
Eastern countries. The active participation of the PRC 
in the UN throughout the First Gulf War could have 
created the impression that it was a de facto ally of 
the West.  Meanwhile, the PRC’s position of not 
using force against Iraq (a country feared by many in 
the Gulf region) angered Egypt, Kuwait and other 
countries in the Gulf region. In their opinion, the PRC 
cannot be relied upon to help its Arab friends and as a 
result, it was excluded from consultations post-crisis 
security arrangements of the Gulf region and 
reconstruction projects in Kuwait. 
However, it is not clear whether the short-term 
economic and diplomatic losses were offset by the 
long-terms gains that the PRC earned as a 
consequence of the First Gulf War. It is true that the 
PRC suffered significant financial losses as a 
consequence of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. However, 
the PRC’s readiness to take part in Western-led 
collective action rehabilitated its public image and 
restored the conditions to grow its economy that were 
present before the Tiananmen incident.  Even before 
Resolution 678 was put to vote, Western Europe was 
so happy with the PRC’s involvement on the first 
eleven resolutions that they removed the economic 
sanctions against the PRC. By the end of December 
1990, Japan recommenced the extension of loans and 
financial assistance that were discontinued after the 
Tiananmen incident. In spite of tough Congressional 
opposition, Washington finally granted the PRC the 
Most Favored Nation trading status (Shichor, 2005). 
It is also unclear as to whether or not the Gulf War 
caused severe losses to the PRC’s diplomatic 
relations as contended by Harris. To better understand 
how the PRC’s relationship with Iraq and the other 
Gulf countries were hurt due to the war, we need to 
make a couple of qualifications. In the first instance, 
the PRC continued to have open dialogues with the 
Middle Eastern countries throughout the entire 
duration of the crisis. It did all it can to achieve a 
peaceful settlement of the crisis before Resolution 
678 was put to vote. Immediately after Iraq invaded 
Kuwait in August 1990, the PRC sent an emissary to 
the Middle East and it was one of only a few 
countries to do so. From November 6 to 12, 1990, the 
Chinese foreign minister, Qian Qichen, went to Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq, and his objective was 
“to explore with leaders of those countries the 
possibility of a peaceful settlement of the Gulf crisis” 
(Yanhui, 1990). In this capacity, the PRC actively 
engaged with the countries in the region. When 
performing the role of an intermediary between the 
Western countries and Iraq, the PRC actively 
promoted dialogue and also took on the role of a 
messenger (Yang, 2013). 
Secondly, the economic losses that the PRC 
experienced were basically for the short-term only. 
As can be seen in the next section, after 1992 the 
PRC’s bilateral relationship with the Gulf countries 
grew and when the PRC needed oil from the region it 
benefited from its earlier policy of unwavering 
neutrality.   
Of greater importance was the fact that the PRC 
managed to attain its principal objective, i.e. the 
restoration of its relationship with the US. For 
example, when Qian visited the Middle East in 
November 1990, he was able to meet James Baker, 
the US Secretary of State in Cairo. During the 
meeting, they discussed whether the PRC will support 
the US-led military action against Iraq (Alterman, 
2008). Qian subsequently claimed that his meeting 
with Baker was “conducive to improving relations 
between China and the United States.” (Yanhui, 
1990)  As a reward for not vetoing Resolution 678, 
the US granted the PRC’s request for Qian to meet 
President Bush in December 1990. It was the first 
time after the Tiananmen incident that a senior 
Chinese official has received an invitation to visit the 
White House. The First Gulf War made the countries 
involved in the crisis realize the need for vital 
bilateral dialogue and it gave rise to the notion that 
China-US cooperation is essential for the New World 
Order (Shichor, 2005). 
The PRC’s relations with other countries, especially 
the US, France, Germany, and Japan, improved 
significantly. The increased investments and the huge 
revenue from trade with the aforementioned countries 
made the Chinese leaders tread cautiously so as not to 
damage its own economy. However, if the PRC does 
not do anything, its own economic interests will 
suffer. This is because the PRC has become a new 
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world economic powerhouse. At the same time, 
Taiwan was a new threat to the Chinese economy. 
However, if the PRC were to invade Taiwan and 
force its reunification with the PRC, similar to 
Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, the Chinese economy 
will be destroyed (Nafie, 1999).  
The remittance era ended in the early 1990s when the 
Saudis punished Yemen economically for supporting 
Iraq in the First Gulf War by expelling 800,000 
Yemeni workers within a few weeks. At the same 
time, the US cut off all aids and the USAID mission 
in Sana’a was closed (Schmitz, 2011).  
China is keen to provide grants to Yemen, support 
continuously, maintain relations, particularly in a 
classic style.  That support is not affected by events 
happened in Yemen from 1990 to 1994 to 2000 to 
2012. China is a classic supportive of security and 
stability in Yemen, providing grants spontaneously 
even under difficult circumstances. In contrast, 
receiving grants from the United States to Yemen is 
affected by political fluctuations and events. For 
example, in supporting his point, the respondent 
opines about the time when he is of the candidates on 
US scholarship students in 1990, but due to the 
position of the Yemeni Gulf crisis, all grants and 
assistance from the US Agency for International 
Development are cancelled (Fakirah, interview, 
2016). 
Yemen apparently sided with Iraq during the Gulf 
War and an enraged Saudi Arabia expelled 800,000 
Yemeni migrant workers thus causing Yemen to 
suffer a loss of hundreds of millions of Saudi Arabia 
in annual remittances. Yemen’s unemployment rate 
increased by not less than one-third and is currently at 
40%. The Saudis were greatly concerned with the 
Yemeni government’s position on the war and have 
said in letters to oil companies within its territories 
that it will take “any necessary action to protect the 
sanctity of its borders.” The Saudis must have been 
genuinely concerned, even scared (Schieck, 1992). 
 
2.5 The People’s Republic of China’s stance 
towards the Second Gulf War (2003-09) 
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack in the US 
changed the China-US relations and the situation in 
the Middle East. After the 9/11 incident, the PRC 
supported the US in its fight against terrorists in 
Afghanistan in 2001 and yielded to Washington in the 
Second Gulf War. Factors such as the 9/11 incident, 
the uncovering in 2002 of Iran’s nuclear program and 
the Second Gulf War in 2003 gave rise to 
fundamental changes in the Gulf region. The closer 
China-US relations together with the important 
changes in the Middle Eastern countries prompted the 
PRC to focus on Saudi Arabia and Iran (Wakefield & 
Levenstein, 2011). 
The ceasefire that was drawn up after the end of the 
First Gulf War was a brittle one for it was merely a 
multilateral settlement that was falsely created by 
using the resolutions issued the UN Security Council. 
Saddam’s persistent defiance of the peacekeeping 
sanctions issued by the UN after the end of the First 
Gulf War was a serious reminder of the 
ineffectiveness of the New World Order. 
The matter of Iraq’s hoard of weapons and its 
inspection by the UN failed to make any progress and 
is a significant factor that contributed to the start of 
the Second Gulf War. Saddam already has a record of 
having used chemical weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD). During the Iran-Iraq War, his military forces 
have been known to have used the chemical WMD. 
In a now infamous campaign known as the “Anfal” of 
spoils of war, an estimated 50,000 to 100,000 
Iranians were killed. The UN Security Council issued 
Resolution 687 in April 1991 which ordered Iraq to 
destroy all its chemical and biological weapons and 
reaffirmed the imposition of economic sanctions 
under Resolution 661.  Resolution 687 also called for 
the creation of the United Nations Special 
Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) to monitor the 
disarmament of Iraq. UNSCOM found evidence that 
Iraq has made huge investments on chemical, 
biological and nuclear weapons. In August 1998, 
Saddam caused a global crisis by suspending Iraq’s 
cooperation with UNSCOM and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which were 
conducting weapons inspection in Iraq. 
The US Congress responded by enacting the Iraq 
Liberation Act that called for the containment of Iraq 
and a change of its regime. Tensions intensified in 
1999 when the Iraqis tried to shoot down US and 
British planes in the no-fly zones of northern and 
southern Iraq. The suspension of the weapons 
inspection program, Saddam’s maneuverings that 
overcame the effects of the economic sanctions and 
the defiance of his military forces in the no-fly zones 
that undermined the US containment policy, when 
taken together, convinced the US government that 
they can no longer tolerate Saddam as he was a threat 
to the US national security (Katzman, 2009). 
In the meantime, the PRC kept on insisting that no 
force should be used to resolve the deteriorating US-
Iraq dispute. Qin Hausen, China's UN ambassador, 
commented that the unilateral military strikes carried 
out by the US in the no-fly zone were “a worrying 
trend” when there has been “willful use of force, 
especially unilateral actions taken without the 
Council’s authorization,” (Yang, 2013).  
Subsequently, the 9/11 incident happened and 
exposed the US vulnerability which profoundly 
changed Washington’s concept of national security. 
With the 9/11 incident fresh in everybody’s mind, 
Saddam’s refusal to give up possession of nuclear 
weapons together with the mistaken belief that Iraq 
harbors Al Qaeda operatives, the evidence against 
Iraq looked damning. The US was ready to go to war 
and the PRC, with its obligations to look after its 
economic interests and at the same time support the 
US in its time of need, was in a tight spot because the 
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issues were in conflict with its foreign policy 
interests. 
The Second Gulf War was for the PRC a different 
kettle of fish as compared to the Iran-Iraq War and 
the First Gulf War. Several factors were not in favor 
of the PRC endorsing President Bush’s Second Gulf 
War. For a start, the PRC’s economic participation in 
the Persian Gulf has never been so indispensable to 
its modernization program. Its sales of arms, export 
of labor and involvement in construction projects had 
all been reduced and all of them have been replaced 
by the importance of oil (Shichor, 2005).  The 
possibility of the US invading Iraq threatens the 
PRC’s USD 7 billion plus obligations and USD 1 
billion worth of oil contracts in Iraq, and any increase 
in oil prices may cause serious economic 
repercussions in the PRC (Mao, 2005). Beijing’s 
standing in the international community has improved 
significantly, the Tiananmen incident is now a distant 
memory and the PRC is now a respected economic, 
military and political power. As can be seen through 
the PRC’s reaction to the First Gulf War, Beijing 
showed through its well-considered actions that it 
was a responsible stakeholder almost the same way as 
it builds up its integrity in the Middle East through its 
policy of non-interference. 
Nonetheless, Beijing’s hands were practically tied 
caused by its interest in currying favor in the post-
Cold War era or if nothing else avoids angering the 
US. The conditions that gave rise to the Second Gulf 
War provided justification to the PRC to support the 
war from a security standpoint as the US initial 
premise to invade Iraq was due to the threat of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The PRC may 
have accepted this reason because it is more 
acceptable than the US use of human rights issues as 
the reason for its intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo 
in the 1990s (Green, 2008).  More significantly, 
Beijing was at pains to mend its relationship with the 
US after the strained tone it had taken on at the 
beginning of the new millennium. The incident where 
a US reconnaissance plane collided with a Chinese 
fighter jet in 2001 caused a diplomatic crisis. At that 
time, when President Bush mentioned “rogue states” 
in his national security speeches, many analysts were 
of the view that he was indirectly implying that the 
PRC was backing these regimes. In addition to that, a 
classified document entitled  US Nuclear Posture 
Review, that was leaked to the press in 2002, listed 
the PRC as one of only seven possible targets of US 
nuclear attack. The Bush doctrine, adopted by the 
Bush administration, which promotes aggressive 
preemptive warfare further elicited Beijing’s fears 
(Van Ness, 2004). Under this scenario, the PRC 
cannot risk offending a vulnerable and war-hungry 
Washington. 
Shichor thinks that the Chinese government may even 
have quietly encouraged the US-led military 
intervention in the believe (mistakenly) would be the 
quickest and least troublesome approach to solving 
the problem caused by Saddam’s stubbornness. The 
PRC was now significantly dependent on the Gulf 
countries for oil and exceptionally keen to see 
regional and economic stability so as to further its 
own economic growth. Saddam’s unpredictable 
control over the export of oil from Iraq together with 
the fear he stirred in the states of the Gulf region was 
not good for regional and economic stability.  Having 
seen how the US military is capable of in the First 
Gulf War, it was not unreasonable to think that the 
use of the US military superiority in the Second Gulf 
War will be able to restore order fairly quickly and 
painlessly. Although the PRC prefers peaceful 
multilateral action, but if the US was insistent on 
invading Iraq, then such swift action if looked at from 
an economic perspective is preferable (Shichor, 
2005). 
The US invaded Iraq in 2003, but on this occasion, it 
bypassed the UN Security Council so as to reduce the 
ability of other countries to weaken the war effort. 
The Chinese actions as a result of the war clearly 
show that its policy to cautiously tread between 
rescuing its own interest and not to antagonize the 
US. Knowing that the conflict was inevitable, the 
PRC anxiously made preparations to face the coming 
economic consequences. Many months before the 
war broke out, the PRC increased its importation of 
oil, which were mainly from Africa and Russia, by 
more than two-thirds over that of the preceding year 
(Mao, 2005). 
 At the same time, the PRC also set up a National 
Energy Commission that was given the task to come 
out with a national energy and oil security plan, fine-
tune the organization of the nation’s energy 
production and consumption as well as to come out 
with a plan to reduce reliance on imported crude oil 
and natural gas (Shichor, 2005). 
Beijing tried to avoid confrontation with Washington 
and whenever it publicly addressed the US action in 
the Gulf it did it by taking a very measured tone. It 
was not a party to the French-German-Russian joint 
statement dated February 24, 2003, that balked at the 
US invasion. Instead, Beijing used the opportunity to 
emphasize the importance of using multilateral 
dialogue to resolve issues. This was also in line with 
the PRC’s general trend to encourage the UN to have 
greater involvement in Iraq throughout the 1990s, 
which is inclusive of the WMD debacle and First 
Gulf War.  The PRC has historically been reluctant to 
participate in the UN, but in spite of that the Chinese 
foreign minister, Tang Jiaxuan, was unusually busy in 
early 2003, going to the UN on four occasions to 
persuade members of the UN to agree to the usage of 
a political solution to resolve the Iraqi conflict. The 
PRC even agreed with Resolution 1546 that 
legitimizes the US-led multinational peacekeeping 
forces presence in Iraq and voted for it. On top of 
that, the PRC’s official disapproval of the US actions 
was moderate. Most of their criticisms of the US was 
their skepticism of its attempts to democratize the 
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Middle East. Even though some newspapers were of 
the opinion that the US military action was a breach 
of international law as well as the UN Charter, but a 
few of them considered that the US was safeguarding 
the new Iraqi regime and helping it to train army 
officers and policemen (Mao, 2005). 
In late 2003, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 
having the objective of promoting China-Iraq 
economic relations, invited Trade Minister Ali Allawi 
to visit Beijing. During the visit, the PRC pledged to 
give Iraq USD 25 million in humanitarian aid. The 
PRC has attempted to build the political groundwork 
in order to foster strong relations with post-Saddam 
Iraq through its support of measures to participate in 
the reconstruction of Iraq. If the PRC can gain a 
foothold in Iraq, it will gain major business 
opportunities and enhance the security of PRC’s 
energy supply. 
When Bhr Ul-Uloum, president, Iraqi Interim 
Governing Council, visited the PRC in March 2004, 
President Hu Jintao highlighted to him that his 
country will consolidate as well as develop bilateral 
cooperation with Iraq and supports the view that Iraq 
must be governed by Iraqis. 
In March 2006, the Tenth Chinese National People’s 
Congress was held. In its fourth session, Li Zhaoxing, 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, spoke about the three 
principles for the reconstruction of Iraq and they are 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
He call upon the UN and the international community 
to play a greater role in the reconstruction of Iraq 
which was in line with the PRC’s proposal to the 
Security Council in May 2004 calling for the 
withdrawal of US-led troops from Iraq. A smaller 
American role would make it easier for the PRC to 
penetrate post-war Iraq. Trade and investment will 
grow with the new government provided it is able to 
enhance the security and stability of the country, 
especially after the withdrawal of the US troops 
(Ghafouri, 2009). 
 
2.6 Evaluation: The People’s Republic of China 
and the Second Gulf War 
As in the case of the First Gulf War, the PRC also 
experienced immediate economic loss as a result of 
the Second Gulf War. From January to April 2003, 
Chinese oil imports went up by 42.9%, but its 
payment grew disproportionately and went up by 
110.6% annually, costing the PRC about USD 4 
billion more. The war also affected not less than 100 
projects with Chinese involvement that were in 
progress in the MENA region, thus affecting contract 
workers in the tens of thousands (Pan, 2008). 
Yet the PRC managed to realize substantial long-term 
rewards from the Second Gulf War. Beijing was 
judicious in its restraint in criticizing the US-led war 
effort. As a result, the US did not put the PRC in the 
list of countries (France, Germany and Russia were in 
the list) that were not allowed to bid for 
reconstruction projects in Iraq (Shichor, 2005). The 
PRC pledged USD 25 million for the reconstruction 
efforts and to write-off a big portion of Iraq’s 
outstanding debts that amounted to a few billion 
dollars. The latter act was an attempt by the PRC 
enhance its goodwill and to also substantial benefits 
from the new government. In fact, Shen Guofang, the 
Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister, said explicitly that 
the PRC wrote-off debts incurred during Saddam’s 
regime for the purpose of being allowed to bid for big 
oil and infrastructure projects (Mao, 2005). 
The Chinese overtures were well received and in 
November 2008, the CNPC entered into a 
“developing service contract” with the Iraqi Ministry 
of Oil restarted development of the Al-Ahdab oilfield, 
which was originally signed in 1997. In 2009, a joint 
venture between the CNPC and BP was awarded the 
rights to the Rumaila oilfields. Rumaila, Iraq’s largest 
oilfield, is known to have oil reserves amounting to 
about 17 billion barrels and is also the world’s sixth 
largest oilfield. In the same year, the joint venture 
between the CNPC, Total, and Petronas won the 
contract for the Halfaya oilfield located in southern 
Iraq (Lee, 2013) and it now able to produce 1.4 
million barrels per day, which is more than half of 
Iraq’s total output. 
The US miscalculated and as a result it prolonged its 
presence in the Iraq this in a way confirmed the 
prudence of the PRC’s policy of non-interference. 
The Standing Committee of the Central Political 
Bureau of the Communist Party of China, usually 
known as the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), 
treated the American’s miserable failure in Iraq as a 
valuable lesson for the PRC not to get involved in 
other country’s internal politics.  The PRC also 
benefited from the Second Gulf War, not financially 
but strategically, because the power of the US 
declined. The US was so preoccupied with Iraq that it 
did not come out with any anti-China containment 
policy. In a broader sense, the war diverted the 
attention and resources of the US, made it suffer more 
financial distress, eroded its credibility with its allies 
and tarnished its international image. From the 
military perspective, the Second Gulf War offered the 
PRC another view of the American’s latest military 
technology and insight into the use of information-
intensive modern warfare. 
It was a new predicament for the Chinese, for it was 
not desirous, even in a small way, of making any 
contribution to regional security efforts. In fact, it was 
of the opinion that previous US military intervention 
in the Gulf, in particular, the US-led invasion of Iraq 
in 2003, as destabilizing. Nonetheless, Alterman is of 
the view that the relationships among the US, the 
PRC, and the Gulf countries are likened to an 
“inescapable triangle” whereby each party has 
substantial leverage that can be used against the other 
two should they try to readjust or change the 
relationships in the region. Interdependence in the 
current context would mean that all the three parties 
have to cooperate with each other. Hence, the PRC’s 
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dispatch of peacekeepers to Lebanon was, in the 
opinion of Alterman, a positive sign that the Chinese 
recognized the need to have international cooperation 
on security matters. Nonetheless, he said that “there is 
something inherently unstable about a region that 
relies on the West for security and the East for 
prosperity.” (Wakefield & Levenstein, 2011). 
However, for the PRC its import of Iraqi crude oil 
was increasing at a rapid pace and it comes with risks 
and security problems. Iraq’s security was 
deteriorating, there was sectarian tensions and 
endemic corruption, and Iraq’s infrastructure was 
insufficient. The aforementioned issues can adversely 
affect Iraq’s stability and stability is an essential 
factor for the increase in production of oil. These 
issues may also threaten the important of goods and 
adversely affect the bottom line of Iraqi oil 
companies.  For the PRC, the Second Gulf War can 
cause it to suffer strategic losses and to face complex 
economic challenges in future. For the long term, the 
war will have serious consequences for the PRC’s 
strategic position in Asia, the security of its oil 
supplies and its economic growth. People who 
criticized the war just because the PRC appeared to 
have “won” a larger chunk of Iraqi oil when compare 
to the US are equally misguided and have failed to 
see the big picture. Even if the Second Gulf War did 
not happen, the PRC’s trade and energy relations with 
Iraq would still have expanded at a rapid pace. This is 
because of its rapid economic development and to 
secure a source of oil to feed its increasing demand 
for the commodity. The PRC’s trade with the Middle 
Eastern countries, including the post-Saddam Iraq, 
has experienced rapid growth. We cannot assume that 
the PRC was a “victor” of the Second Gulf War for in 
actual fact the war made it harder, costlier and riskier 
for the Chinese oil companies to invest and manage 
their business in Iraq (Chaziza, 2014). 
Lastly, from the time the US withdrew its troops, Iraq 
had to confront a growing crisis caused by threats 
from the Sunni jihadist group known as the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) to start a civil war. 
From the perspective of the Obama administration 
they were unfortunate and this was because among 
the countries that were willing to aid Iraq were the 
PRC and Iran, two countries that have particularly 
complex relationship with the US. The PRC, the 
largest foreign investor in the Iraqi oil sector, was 
anxiously keeping watch of the growing crisis in Iraq. 
The PRC was prepared to work together with Iran, an 
important player and ally in the region, to re-establish 
stability in Iraq. In addition to that, improved ties 
between Iraq and Iran will erode the US control in the 
country. 
 
III. THE IMPACT OF YEMEN’S CIVIL WAR 
IN  1994   
 
We have already discussed the subject of Yemen’s 
unification and the different and long stages of the 
unification process as well as the wars that were 
fought between the two major regions of Yemen until 
its successful unification on May 22, 1990. 
Furthermore, we discussed the PRC’s stance with 
regards to the various stages of the unification 
process. However, this research will deal with the 
issues of Yemen’s civil war in 1994, which 
threatened to break up Yemen, in the following 
pages.  This research is interested in the PRC’s stance 
with regards to the war that sought to split it again. In 
some analysts view, the separation war and the PRC’s 
stance on the matter marked the real beginning of the 
development of Yemen-China relations. As such this 
research will divide it into two topics. The first topic 
will deal with the circumstances and implications that 
caused the war and the second is the PRC’s stance 
towards the civil war in Yemen. 
In May 1994, South Yemen tried to break away from 
the newly-formed Republic of Yemen, a move that 
Saudi Arabia supported because the new republic did 
not serve its interest. The government of the Republic 
of Yemen acted to crush the separatist movement and 
after three months they were defeated and their 
leaders fled the country. President Saleh regained 
complete control of the whole country and sought 
revenge against the southerners. But, he refrained 
from confronting Riyadh even though there was very 
little doubt that the Saudi government was involved 
in the matter.  President Saleh’s restraint was indeed 
remarkable considering the huge amount of 
destruction that was inflicted on Yemen. 
Subsequently, the Yemeni president estimated that 
the short war cost Yemen more than USD 7 billion as 
the Southerners set fire to the refinery in Aden and 
fired Scud missiles at Sana’a. Then the Saudi 
government deployed troops into Asir province in 
late December 1994. This act of aggression is similar 
to the one Sana’a and Riyadh did in the 1930s. As 
highlighted above, Asir’s status was never settled for 
the Yemenis only leased it to the Saudis and they 
have never given up their claim to the region. In fact, 
the lease has to be renewed every twenty years and 
when it became due for renewal in 1994, the Saudi 
government unilaterally expropriated the disputed 
territory. To Yemen, the said disputed territory is 
important because there are newly discovered 
oilfields within the area. Skirmishes between the two 
sides continued to a point where an escalation of the 
dispute was inevitable. In fact, at one point in time, it 
was alleged that the Saudi government had amassed 
their troops at three locations along the border it 
shares with Yemen (Pelletiere, 1996). 
 
3.1 The circumstances and implications that gave 
rise to the 1994 war 
North and South Yemen finally agreed to unite to 
form the new Republic of Yemen in 1990. It is 
believe that the unification arose out of emotional 
motivations amidst the international conditions that 
were imposed on both governments, North and South 
International Journal of Management and Applied Science, ISSN: 2394-7926                                                 Volume-3, Issue-3, Mar.-2017 
http://iraj.in 
The Political Relations Between Yemen and the People’s Republic of China during Ali Abdullah Saleh’s Administration from 1990 to 2012 
 
30 
Yemen, to unite. The unification of the two countries 
was a historical wish and both governments adopted 
unification as its slogan. The international community 
helped to make the wish come true and at the same 
time North and South Yemen were smitten by the 
unforeseen historical opportunity, which at the 
meantime was fueled by popular enthusiasm. As a 
result, both countries could not impose any of their 
own conditions on the other for they would otherwise 
have been crushed by the masses and condemned for 
losing a huge historical opportunity. 
Both governments thought that when unification was 
successfully carried out, they would have played the 
game intelligently as both parties were willing 
participants of the game. During that period, the 
world was experiencing dramatic political changes 
such as the collapse of communism in the Soviet 
Union. South Yemen was the only Marxist regime in 
the region and at that point in time its treasury was 
empty, and as such, it had no option but to unite with 
North Yemen. For South Yemen, the unification was 
a solution to the problems it was facing as well as a 
new path into the Arab world. The Yemeni Socialist 
Party of South Yemen, a Marxist organization, 
thought that it would be able to become the new 
government of the Republic of Yemen after the 
unification. Similarly, North Yemen was also 
internally motivated by the conditions to unite with 
South Yemen. The two regimes actually did not find 
any strong reasons that supported their unification, 
but merely accepted the popular choice of its people 
to unite with each other. (Barja, 2002). 
After the unification, the Yemeni Socialist 
Party discovered that the General People’s Congress 
was more adept in organization and control. Ali 
Salim Al-Beidh, the ex-president of North Yemen, 
subsequently discovered that the president of the 
Republic of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, had full 
control of all the government machineries, whereas 
he, the Vice President was powerless. As a result, the 
rift between them widened and they each started 
looking for strong reasons to challenge each other 
(Dammag, 2005). 
Since the unification in 1990, conflicts 
between the two systems have arisen and its number 
may have accumulated, Such disputes were boosted 
by trying to separate the real foundations.    The 
Yemen Socialist Party still had their own army and 
police in the south for they were not integrated with 
that of North Yemen when the new republic was 
formed and likewise, the situation in the north was 
the same. The two separate parties sought to 
independently strengthen their own political and 
military apparatus. They then started to blame each 
other for corruption and the poor management of the 
new republic’s security or army, but both parties 
stayed their grounds until the general elections that 
were held on April 27, 1993. The election did not 
produce any clear-cut winners and the General 
People’s Congress (won 123 seats) formed a coalition 
with the extremist party, Islah (won 62 seats) to form 
the new government. The Yemeni Socialist Party won 
only 56 parliamentary seats and were not invited to 
join the government by the General People’s 
Congress and Islah. 
The people of Yemen are deeply religious, 
but political Islam is not simply an expression of 
religiosity for it is more than that, and Islah does not 
merely represent political Islam but is also more than 
that. Islah’s roots goes back to the then Saudi-backed 
conservative in order to opposition to the socialist-
backed National Democratic Front’s insurgency in 
south-central Yemen Arab Republic. The shadowy 
“extremist Islamic Front” had considerable influence 
in the north during the 1970s and 1980s. The 
influence was partly gained through a chain of 
religious institutes that were set up using private and 
Saudi money and like many Arab regimes, through 
Sana’a’s utilization of religious right as a tool against 
the left (Norton, 2001). 
The southerners were of the view that the leaders of 
the YSP united South Yemen with North Yemen in 
1990, did so in the belief that upon unification, the 
YSP would at the minimum be equal partners with 
the GPC to form the new government. However, at 
the same time, the YSP harbored deep misgivings on 
what they perceived as a closed, tribal-dominated 
northern institution. The presence of these 
perceptions was obtained from interviews with the 
southern politicians and newspapers. They suggested 
that the root cause of the civil war can be traced back 
to the date of the unification, three years prior to Vice 
President Ali Salim Al-Beidh went into self-imposed 
exile in Aden (Hudson, 1995). 
We may conclude that when the YSP and 
the southern leaders opted for unification they did it 
with mixed feelings. They were aware that the idea of 
Yemeni unity was very popular among the Northern 
and Southern Yemenis and the political advantage 
that it can gain through its association with such a 
project. They had their own development agenda 
which they hope can suppress tribalism, eradicate 
corruption and reduce backwardness, the bane of 
northern politics (Dammag, 2005). 
They sowed opportunities to become a part 
of and in due course control a greater Yemen whose 
socio-economic and political potentials exceed that of 
the decrepit conditions in the PDRY. But, they were 
scared that they might end up being dominated by the 
northerner’s political way of life that they do not 
respect, and were mainly worried about the 
possibility of a new but developing Islamic 
movement. Should the unfortunate event happen in 
future, they figured that they can get out of the union 
and then restore and dominate again an independent 
South Yemen, just like the way the military and 
security institutions were organized even upon 
unification. 
It was agreed that a unified Yemen will 
substantially reduce its military institution, but for 
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Haythem Qasim Tahir (from YSP), the Minister of 
Defense, it was impossible to make cutbacks or 
integrate the southern and the northern units. His 
decrees were simply disregarded by the chief-of-staff, 
a loyal supporter of Saleh. Al-Attas submitted a 
comprehensive document for military integration on 
April 1992, but its implementation was postponed 
indefinitely. At the same time, the leaders of the YSP 
believed that Iraqi military officers were brought to 
Sana’a to conduct military training for the northern 
armed forces (Hudson, 1995). 
From the point of view of the YSP, a pattern 
of violence that started in 1991 and continued 
periodically until the outbreak of the civil war in May 
1994 was an ominous sign. Usually the targets of the 
violence were YSP officials and their relatives. The 
political and economic consequences of the Gulf war 
sparked off, as described by a Western journalist, an 
unprecedented spate of fighting in September and 
October 1991, and the same has been portrayed by 
Al-Attas as the first crisis to occur after the 
unification. The next crisis unfolded in 1992 and it 
was a chain of assassinations and intimidations 
starting with the Minister of Justice, Abd Al-Wasi al 
Sallam who was from the YSP in spring of the same 
year. Then Al-Attas himself became the next target as 
several attempts against him was carried out in 1992 
and 1993. Subsequently, Al-Attas’ brother, who was 
not involved in politics, was found murdered in Aden 
in July 1993 (Barja, 2002). 
Then the house of the Speaker of Parliament 
Dr. Nu’man, who was from the YSP, was hit by a 
rocket. Even though international observers were of 
the view that the April 1993 parliamentary election 
were reasonably free, the acts of intimidation did not 
stop and the dean of a teachers training school was 
assassinated. Then on October 29, 1993 the nephew 
of Vice President Al-Beidh was murdered. Al-Attas 
calls the preceding events the third crisis, and the 
Prime Minister, for the sake of his own safety, left 
Sana’a in January 1994. 
Sana’a was verbally accused of starting the 
series of military confrontations, and that taken 
together with Saleh’s speech on April 27, 1994, were 
deemed to be a declaration of war. The preceding 
events were used as justification for Al-Beidh to 
declare that the south was seceding from the Republic 
of Yemen. Subsequently, the YSP accused seventeen 
Sana’a officials, starting with Islah’s president 
Abdullah Al Ahmar and its members, and President 
Saleh (and also some members of his family and 
tribe) of being the brains behind the conspiracy to 
start a war (Hudson, 1995).  President Saleh and his 
men were also of the opinion there was a conspiracy. 
Officials from Sana’a claimed that the plot to break 
up the Republic of Yemen was hatched at a meeting 
in Geneva in 1992 between senior leaders of the YSP 
and a high-ranking Saudi official who has been 
described as a foreign policy troubleshooter. Sana’a’s 
interpretation of the event is that the conspiracy was 
concretized after the parliamentary elections of April 
1993 when the YSP fared badly by winning only 56 
seats (Dammag, 2005). 
Ubaid (2003) contends that the Yemeni 
government, from as early as May 1993, had claimed 
that Al-Yamda, a former South Yemeni airline, had 
started transporting light arms from Lebanon and 
Egypt to Aden to strengthen the YSP’s army. In early 
October 1993, the Yemeni government detected the 
unloading of arms in the harbor of Aden. By January 
1994, the plot was described as operational by 
officials from the north. Sana’a’s intelligence agency 
detected that military equipment, and in increasing 
amounts, was arriving regularly in the former PDRY. 
As the YSP were too poor to buy MiG-29s, armored 
personnel carriers, tanks and other military equipment 
from the former countries of the Soviet bloc, Sana’a 
suspected that Yemen’s rich neighbors who are also 
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are 
the probable financiers (Ubaid, 2003). 
The first round of the crisis began after Al-
Beidh’s visit to Paris in early August 1993, while on 
his way home after his visit to the US, on the pretext 
that he needed medical treatment. Actually, he held a 
secret meeting with the US and Saudi officials in 
Paris. When he was in Washington he held an 
unsanctioned meeting with his US counterpart, Vice 
President Al Gore. The meeting with Al Gore was 
held without the knowledge of members of the 
Presidential Council and not according to the protocol 
of the Yemeni embassy in Washington. Sana’a 
interprets the move as another example of 
conspiratorial maneuvering or in other words an 
attempt to enlist the support of the US for the YSP’s 
cause (Dammag, 2005). 
While he was in Paris, Al-Beidh also had a 
secret meeting with representatives of the Gulf 
countries who are known to oppose the Yemeni 
unification. Al Beidh shocked Arab journalist he met 
in Paris when he made spiteful denunciations against 
the unification process and also spoke about the 
possibility of secession. Observers conjectured that 
Al-Beidh had been bribed by the Saudis, who 
allegedly offered to share Hadhramout’s oil wealth 
with him. The preceding agreement was confirmed 
after Al-Beidh granted important concessions to 
Saudi Arabia regarding a piece of Yemenis territory 
located south of the Rub Al-Khali desert. He has 
apparently also promised to give a strip of land to 
Saudi Arabia to enable them to gain direct access to 
the Indian Ocean (Saint-Prot, 2000, Dammag, 2005). 
The recent oil discovery in a region that is 
disputed by Saudi Arabia and Yemen has revealed the 
true colors of the inhabitants of the peninsula. Yemen 
need the oil revenues badly and regards the area as a 
part of Yemen. Saudi Arabia took control of the area 
after its war with North Yemen in 1934 and the treaty 
over the area was due for renewal in 1994. Currently, 
Yemen’s oil production is 200,000 bpd and expects 
the new discovery to produce 800,000 bpd. Out of the 
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20 producing oil concessions, 12 of them are found in 
the area claimed by the Saudis. One of the Saudi’s 
main concerns is that since Yemen has a larger 
population (13 million) than Saudi Arabia (10 
million), the new oil discovery will tip the balance of 
power in favor of Yemen in about 20 years from now. 
Yemen’s unification is proceeding smoothly, but it 
needs the revenue from oil. Its production was 
220,000 bpd and is expected to be at 350,000 bpd by 
1995 (Schieck, 1992). 
Saudi Arabia’s action was basically to make 
the south stronger, whether it was or after the civil 
war. The Saudi’s effort for the parties to the conflict 
to agree to a ceasefire was perceived by Sana’a as an 
effort by Saudi Arabia to give the southerners a 
greater opportunity to consolidate their position in 
their quest for independence. At the tail end of the 
conflict, the Saudis were reported to have lobbied the 
other Arab regimes to recognize South Yemen’s 
independence. According to a few source, the Saudi 
Arabian government has also provided military 
assistance to the south. The Saudis was afraid of the 
amount of progress the democratization process has 
made in Yemen, for there was in actual fact now a 
fair amount of political freedom in Yemen. Many 
independent newspapers are free to criticize the 
country’s top leaders and some have even openly told 
President Salih to resign. A large numbers of 
international observers have said that Yemen’s 
parliamentary elections in April 1993 was free and 
fair (Katz, 1994). 
The most important reason why the Saudis 
opposed Salih’s regime was due to the position he 
took during the First Gulf War. While Sana’a may 
claim that it remained neutral in order to help to 
resolve the dispute peacefully, Salih’s work at that 
time actually helped Iraq. Yemen’s quest for an 
“Arab solution” to the crisis actually angered many 
supporters of Saudi Arabia since they were the same 
Arab countries that opposed Saddam’s invasion of 
Kuwait and were able to expel Iraq by themselves or 
defend Saudi Arabia if it is attacked by Iraq 
(Dammag, 2005). 
The main reason why Kuwait supported the 
south was because Kuwait was still angry with 
President Salih’s support of Saddam when Iraq 
occupied Kuwait and this was in spite of the fact that 
Kuwait had been giving economic assistance to 
Yemen for many years. As such, the Kuwaitis wanted 
to weaken, punish and even overthrow Salih. But, 
during the civil war, other governments in the region 
were reportedly on the side of the north or unity 
government.  One of them was Qatar and according 
to some sources, it gave financial aid to Saleh’s 
regime during the conflict. Jordan was another 
country that was reported to have supported Saleh’s 
regime. Jordan was like Yemen, for its actions were 
also perceived to be supportive of Iraq during the 
First Gulf War. Jordan, like Yemen, also incurred the 
wrath of the Saudis and Kuwaitis for its actions. 
Unsurprisingly, Iraq sided with Saleh’s government 
and an Iraqi military officer was reported to have 
aided the north in its military campaign against the 
south (Saint-Prot, 2000 & Dammag, 2005). 
On April 27 and 28, 1994 an armored unit 
relocated from Aden to the north after reunification 
had a confrontation with a government unit in Amran, 
located north of Sana’a. On May 5, 1994, Sana’a’s 
army marched into Aden. On May  21, 1994, the 
point of no return was crossed and announced  Al-
Beidh the formation of the Yemen Democratic 
Republic in the south. 
As a result of the diplomatic efforts carried 
out by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the Yemeni crisis was 
referred to the Security Council. On June 1, 1994, the 
UN Security Council issued Resolution 924 which 
requested the world community to resolve the conflict 
using peaceful means so as “to reestablish peace and 
stability in the Republic of Yemen” and to protect the 
security of the region. The resolution called for (1) an 
immediate ceasefire, (2) a stop to all deliveries of 
weapons and equipment that can be used to prolong 
the fighting, (3) the rejection of violence to resolve 
differences, and (4) the Secretary General of the UN 
to send a mission to meet the two parties to the 
conflict to persuade them to agree to a dialogue.   
When the Saudis requested for intervention 
they bypassed the Yemeni government, but 
Resolution 924 was a disappointment to all the 
regional players as they supported separation and this 
was especially so after support reached USD 200.  
The Security Council was of the opinion that the 
Yemeni conflict was a domestic issue and as such did 
not consider the issue of separation. The northerner’s 
troops controlled the battlefield and were victorious. 
At the same time, the northerners were also able to 
frustrate all the efforts made by the countries in the 
region to internalize the crisis. In July 1994, one 
week after Resolution 931 was issued, the 
northerner’s troops managed to enter Aden, but by 
then the separatist elements have already fled to 
Oman and Djibouti (Dammag, 2005).  
 
3.2 The People’s Republic of China’s stance 
towards the Yemeni civil war of (1994) 
As the disputes escalated, in February 1994 
three Chinese workers working on a road project 
linking Hajana with Mareb and financed by the PRC 
were kidnapped. The three workers were released on 
April 3, 1994, and by the end of May 1994, the PRC 
evacuated about 500 of their medical staff and 
contract workers from Yemen. However, the relations 
between the PRC and Yemen were not affected by 
the kidnapping incident. The Chinese officials were 
happy with Yemen’s efforts to secure the release of 
the Chinese workers. However, they were concerned 
about the continuing conflict in Yemen. When the 
PRC’s Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian 
Qichen met the visiting Yemeni Vice Foreign 
Minister Abdul Qadir Bajammal in March 1994, Qian 
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said, “We are very much concerned about Yemen’s 
domestic situation and hope that the country will 
realize its social stability and enjoy a good 
environment for its construction... we believe that the 
Yemeni people will solve their own problems 
themselves.” 
The Chinese government was concerned 
about foreign intervention, particularly by the 
Soviets, and its impact on the conflict in the unified 
state. During Abd al-Aziz al-Ghani’s, a member of 
the Presidential Council of Yemen, visit to Beijing in 
June 1994, Chinese officials highlighted the 
importance of settling differences through dialogues 
and rejecting foreign intervention. al-Ghani gave an 
assurance to the Chinese that Yemen will reject all 
attempts by foreign countries to intervene in its 
internal affairs. Some of the Yemeni officials 
expressed their appreciation of the PRC’s support of a 
united Yemen (Huwaidin, 2001). 
 
IV. STRATEGIC AND DIPLOMATIC 
COOPERATION  
 
The Yemen-China relationship consists of at least 
three pillars: (1) strategic and economic relations; (2) 
diplomatic relations; and (3) social and cultural 
relations. This relationship is different from the 
PRC’s other bilateral relations because in the former 
there is internal balance in the three pillars. However, 
the majority of international observers of Yemen-
China relations will only concentrate on political 
support, sales of weapons and non-interference. 
However, this approach is too narrow for us to fully 
understand the relationship. 
The Republic of Yemen’s strategic geographical 
location makes it an important country to the PRC 
because from there it is possible to observe three 
important areas, i.e. the Arabian Gulf, the Horn of 
Africa and the Red Sea. As such, Yemen is like a 
geographical belt that encompasses the southern part 
of the Arabian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula as 
well as controls Bab al-Mandab and the sea lanes in 
the Arabian Sea and Red Sea.   
As mentioned earlier, the PRC’s economic 
stakes in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula are much 
higher than those in North Africa. Two examples, 
namely Yemen and Bahrain illustrates the point as 
political unrest in the two countries have put the 
PRC’s interest at risk. Where Yemen is concerned, 
Beijing’s uneasiness is caused by the possibility of 
unrest which can disrupt its global maritime trade. 
Nonetheless, Yemen is still significant to the PRC 
principally due to its geo-strategic location. About 
25% of the PRC’s total exports to Europe passes 
through the Bab al-Mandeb, the waterway separating 
Yemen and Djibouti, which in recent years has 
increased incidents of piracy. Violent upheavals in 
countries like Yemen and Somalia can result in a 
failed state and it can place the PRC’s commercial 
interest at risk (Calabrese, 2013). 
 
4.1   Strategic and governmental ties 
Ever since the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between Yemen and the PRC in 1956, ties 
between the two countries have been stable and 
friendly. The year 2006 was the 50th anniversary of 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the 
two countries and bilateral relations have been 
growing steadily and positive progress has also been 
made. They have continued to make frequent high-
level visits exchange during President Saleh’s 
administration from 1990 to 2012; related to subject 
matter are shown in the tables below.  
 
 
Table of High-level visits between China and Yemen, 1990–2012. China delegation to Yemen 
Year China delegation to 
Yemen 
          Position         Purpose of the visit 
May. 1991 Huang Yicheng Minister of Energy 
Resources 
To participate in the celebration marking 




Zhang Shao Chun 
 
Deputy Minister of 
Finance 
 
Signing of an agreement between Yemen 
and China, under which China will 





Secretary of the Fujian 
Province and member of 
the Central Committee of 







_________ Minister of Transport and 
Communications People's 
Republic of China and 
Deputy Chairman of the 
State 
Minister of Transport and 
Communications People's Republic of 
China 
It resulted from the visit to sign a loan 
agreement between the Yemeni and 
Chinese sides,  China gives interest-free 
loan of 10  million dollars to finance 
future economic and technical cooperation 
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Vice Minister, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, People's 
Republic of China  
Political consultation between the Yemen 




Saifuddin Azizi Vice-chairman of the 
CPPCC National 
Committee. 
Deepen understanding and strengthen the 






vice-chairman of the 
Agriculture 
To debate bilateral cooperation in the 
drilling of wells and land reform fields in 
the field of fisheries in Hadramout 
June. 1995 Li Zhaoxing Vice Minister of Foreign 
Affairs 
To hold the third session of political 
consultations between two countries 
April. 1996 Wu Bangguo 
 
Vice-Premier of the State 
Council 
The signing of the economic cooperation, 
especially the oil agreement and provide a 




Sun Guangxiang    
 
Vice-Minister, Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation 
 
To attend Fourth session of Committee of  
Joint Yemeni-Chinese 1996 and discuss a 
number of projects and aid, which was 
needed by Yemen include the agreement 
on the purchase directly Yemeni oil 
without assistance to a third party and the 
participation of Chinese companies to 
companies in Yemen investments in the 
oil and petrochemical 
1996 
 
    ________ Member of Central 
Committee of the 
Communist Party of China 
and Secretary of the Hunan 
Province 







Political consultation between the Yemen 
Foreign Ministry and the China Foreign 
Ministry 
June. 1997  Vice Chairman of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee 
of the National People's 
Congress in China 
At the invitation  from the President of 




Peng Yu Vice health minister of 
China headed the 
delegation. 
Bilateral cooperation between the two 
countries, especially to send   Chinese 





Vice prime minister of 
China 
Sign an agreement establishing friendship 






Vice Minister of Health 
 
During the visit, the signing of the 
bilateral cooperation between the 
Ministries of Health the two countries by 
the agreement have been sending Chinese 




(Timur Da wamaiti) 
 
Vice Chairperson of the 
Standing Committee of the 
8th and 9th National 




On the occasion of Tenth National Day of 







Head of  delegation from  
Department of Foreign 
Relations of the Central 
Committee of the 
Communist Party of China 
To attend the opening of the Second 
Session of the Sixth Conference of the 
General People's Congress in Yemen 
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A  member of the Chinese 
Communist Party 
Committee and State 
Council, 
Special envoy from Chinese leadership to 
meet with President Ali Abdullah Saleh 






Vice Minister of 
Commerce of PRC Head 
of the Chinese business 
delegation 
 
Protection of Chinese investors and 
Chinese companies. In addition offere  
Chinese side   30 million Yuan grant and 
interest-free loan of 20 million Yuan, in 
order to contribute to the implementation 






Vice premier of the State 
Council. Member of the 
Standing Committee of the 
Political Bureau of the 
CPC Central Committee. 
To attend the fourteenth anniversary of the 
reunification of Yemen and seek bilateral 
cooperation between the General People’s 






Foreign Minister of the 
People's Republic of China 
 
Li Zhaoxing met with Yemeni President 
Ali Abdullah Saleh.  Nevertheless, has 
been consultation  about  China's 
contribution to the economic and social 
development and the fight against 








Chinese trade delegation 
represents 17 Chinese 
companies specialized in 
electronics, generators and 
electronic appliances 
The delegation met some Yemeni 








Deputy governor of the 
Chinese Bank for Exports 
and Imports 
 
To Meet with President of the Republic of 
Yemen and   confirmed the desire to 
develop cooperation with Yemen. 
Infrastructure projects that China will be 
funded by the Bank of China's imports and 
exports, for example, four gas stations, 
multi-purpose port and set up rail etc. The 





A senior official of the 
Communist Party of China 
(CPC) 
To attend the Seventh Conference of  the 





Chinese Vice President 
 
To enhance friendship between the two 
countries and the two peoples, and help 




Zhang Li Gao 
 
 
Member of the Standing 
Committee of the Politburo 
of the 18th CPC Central 
Committee; Vice-Premier 
of the State Council  







Member of the 18th CPC 
Central Committee; 
Minister of Public 
Security; State Councilor 
of State Council; Director 
of the National Anti-Terror 
Work Leading Group 
Yemeni Vice President meets with CPC 
delegation.  Guo Shengkun and Hadi 
reviewed a number of topics and issues 
related to the relations between Yemen 
and China. 
 
Source: Archives of the China  Embassy in Yemen, Archives of the Yemen  Embassy in China, reports of the  Yemen embassy in 
Beijing  from 1990-2012, reports of the  China Embassy in Yemen 1990-2012 and http://www.chinavitae.com. 
http://www.chinavitae.com/vip/index.php?mode=topic&topic=foreign%20relations&filter_year=2010. Chinese Foreign Ministry 
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Table of High-level visits between China and Yemen, 1990–2012. Yemen  delegation to China 
Year Yemen  delegation to 
China 
             Position                Purpose of the visit 
1991 
 
Names was not mention 
 
High-level visit of the General 
People's Congress Party and the 
Yemeni Socialist Party 
delegation 
The signing of the cooperation between the 
China Communist Party  the one hand and 
General People's Congress and the 
Socialist Party, on the other hand 
1992 Abdul Karim Alayana  Foreign Minister of Yemen  Exchange views on many international and 
regional issues, for example the Gulf War 
1992 
 
A Military Delegation Deputy Chief of Staff of the 
Technical Affairs and 
armament 
 
Targeted items to complete the follow-up 
actions of two agreements in the field of 




Abu Bakr al-Qirbi vice Minister of Education 
 
A meeting with his Chinese counterpart to 
discuss the cultural and educational field. 
1993  Jamal Al-Khawlani Delegation of Chinese 
Friendship Association  
Expand the scope of Chinese investment in 
various fields in Yemen. 
1994 
 
Abdo Ali Abdul 
Rahman 
Vice Foreign Minister of  
Yemen 
Implementation of the memorandum of 








Assistant Secretary General of 
the General People's Congress, 
Brigadier General Yahya al-
Mutawakkil 
General People's Congress party relations 
with the CPC and ways of cooperation 




Abdo Ali Abdul 
Rahman 
Vice Foreign Minister of  
Yemen 
Upon the invitation of his Chinese 
counterpart as part of the exchange of 
visits and political consultation 
1996 Yahya Kahlani Chairman of the Union of 
Yemen Workers 
The establishment of joint projects 
between the two countries 
1996 Taha Ahmed Ghanem The governor Aden The governor Aden 
1997 
 
 Deputy Minister of of 
Agriculture and Water 
Resources 
To attend the conference of Desertification 
in Beijing May 13, 1997 
1997 Mustafa Berhan Presidential Advisor To attend a meeting of nuclear energy and 
the effect of nuclear radiation. 
1997 Rashid Barbaa Deputy Ministry of Oil and 
Mineral Resources 
To attend the World Petroleum Council 
Conference 
1998 Ali Abdullah Saleh  President of the Republic of 
Yemen 
The occasion of passage 40 years of the 
Yemeni-Chinese relations. Its goal to 
deepen friendship, expanding areas of 
cooperation and development 
1999  
 
Abed Rabbo Mansour 
Hadi 
Vice President of the Republic 
of Yemen 
To follow up the implementation of 
agreements concluded between two 
countries 
1999 Abdullah bin Hussein 
al-Ahmar 
Head of the Yemeni Parliament Strengthening of relations between the 
Yemeni and Chinese parliaments 
2001  Abdul-Aziz Abdul-
Ghani 
Abdul-Aziz Abdul-Ghani Developing aspects of cooperation 
between the Yemeni Shura Council and the 
National Council Consultative Conference 
of China (CPPCC) 
2001 
 
Abdul Wahab Al 
Rouhani 
Minister of Culture 
 
At the invitation of his Chinese counterpart 
How to develop the cultural aspect 
between the two countries 
2001 
 
Ali Hassan al-Ahmadi Minister of Fisheries To develop cooperation in fisheries 
2002 Yahya Ali Alraiy Vice Head of the Parliament To participate in the Asian Parliaments for 
Peace 
2002 Ahmed Alkjlana 
 
Secretary of the capital Sanaa 
 
Meeting with Prime Management Group 
company Chinese roads to benefit from 
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China's experience in improving road 
2002 Abdullah Ahmad 
Farwan 
 
Chairman of the Central 
Organization for Control and 
Auditing (COCA) 
At the invitation Yong, Minister of 
Supervision of the People’s Republic of 
China to attend  The General Assembly 





Deputy of General Authority in 
the Ministry of Tourism and 
Environment 
 
To discuss the Second Overall 
Performance of the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) and the CEO’s Report of on 
the Policies, Operations and Future 





Vice President of the General 
Administration of Textile 
Council 
To follow-up loan from the Chinese 
government to General Organization for 
textile industry in Yemen 
2002  
 
Hussein Alwaly Deputy of the Ministry of 
Public Works and Urban 
Development Sector 
To discuss the aid from China to Yemen 
 
2002 Brigadier General 
Hussein Almsora 
Shura Council member Interview a number of Chinese officials 
2002 
 
Abdul Karim Alayana  
 
 
Presidential Advisor and the 
Secretary General of the 
General People’s Congress 
(GPC),  
 
Response to the invitation him by Central 
Committee of Communist Party of China 
about Iraq special in shade US threats to 
strike Iraq and Convergence of views 
concerning the position of the two 
countries towards anti-terrorism with the 




Abu Bakr al-Qirbi 
 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 
Expanding economic and trade cooperation 
and encourage Chinese enterprises to 
invest in Yemen,  confirm the importance  




Gen  Mohammad 
Ahmad Sharaf With A 
Military Delegation 
Chief of General Staff for 
Logistics and Supply 
Development of military cooperation 
between the armies of the two countries 
relations 
2002 Abdulrahman al-Akwa Minister of Youth and Sports To benefit from  China's experience in 
building sports facilities 
2003 Khaled Rowaishan Minister of Culture and 
Tourism 










To expand fields of political, economic, 
commercial, cultural and scientific 
cooperation between the two countries 
2004 
 
Ahmed Al-Asbahi Assistant Secretary General of  
the General People’s Congress 
(GPC) 
To participate in the Third International 




Nasr Taha Mustafa 
 
Chairman of the Board of 
Management and the official 
Saba news agency 
To sign an agreement of mutual 
cooperation between the Yemeni news 
agency Saba news agency New China 
Xinhua 
2004 Mohammed Ibrahim al-
Hamdi 
 
Deputy Minister of of 
Agriculture and Water 
Resources 
 
To meet with Chinese officials in the 
institutions of meteorological and scientific 
research to harvest clouds (artificial rain) 
in order to obtain the Chinese experience 
in this field 
2004 
 
Ali Bin Ali Al-Zubaidi 
 
Head of the Customs 
Department 
 
To supply container checking devices with 
accessories for processing sites and 
civilian facilities as well as generators and 
electrical systems for all maritime and land 
ports and airports by the  two firms,  Tonic 
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and  China Machine-Building International 
Corporation Economic (CMIC) 
2004 
 
Abdul Karim Mteare 
And a number of 
businessmen 
Chairman of the General 
Authority for Investment 
To participate in the China-Arab 
Investment Seminar 
2004 Yahya al-Shuaibi Governor of Aden Response to invitation to him from the 
Mayor of Shanghai 
2004 
 
Khalid Rajih Sheik 
 
 
Minister of Industry and Trade 
 
 
To participate as head of the first 
conference of Arab businessmen and 
Chinese to implementation as stated in the 




Brig. Rois Megawar A 
Military Delegation 
 
Commander of the naval forces 
and coastal defense 
 
To train senior officers and cooperation 
between the armies of the two countries. In 
addition, China has provided a grant to 
Yemen from 2.5 million Yuan interest-free  
to train 16   student.   Previously,  China 
has provided grants to train number of 






Chairman of the Department of 
Asia and Australia in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 




Ahmed Hamed Faraj 
 
Chairman of the General 
Authority for Civil Aviation 
and Meteorological 
To  sign of the atmospheric Transport 





Deputy Foreign Minister for 
Financial and Administrative 
Affairs 
Visit the Chinese cities to see the Chinese 




Abdul Salam Al Jawfi 
 
Minister of Education 
 
To attend meetings of the fifth session of 
the Ministers of Higher Education 
organized by the Chinese National 
Committee in coordination with UNESCO 
2005 
 
Hussein Taher Bin 
Yahya 
Foreign Ministry 
Undersecretary of Arab, 
African and Asian Affairs 
Participate in political consultations 
between the two Foreign Ministries 





Chinese President Hu Jintao said in Beijing 
on Thursday China will further its trade 
and energy cooperation with Yemen in an 
effort to lift bilateral relations to a new 
height. "China supports and welcomes the 
enterprises to increase their investment in 
the two countries, and is willing to expand 
cooperation with Yemen in such areas as 
energy, infrastructure and fishery," said Hu 
while meeting with visiting Yemeni 
President Ali Abdullah Saleh. 
Source: Archives of the China  Embassy in Yemen, Archives of the Yemen  Embassy in China, reports of the  Yemen embassy in 
Beijing  from 1990-2012, reports of the  China Embassy in Yemen 1990-2012 and http:// http://www.chinavitae.com. 
http://www.chinavitae.com/vip/index.php?mode=topic&topic=foreign%20relations&filter_year=2010.  Chinese Foreign Ministry 
website (www.fmprc.gov.cn) and other news reports, including 
Xinhua News (www.xinhuanet.com), People’s Daily (www.xinhuanet.com) 
 
The most significant and fascinating feature of the 
present Yemen-China relations is the overlap between 
the PRC’s re-engagement with the Middle East was 
the formation in 2004 of the Arab Cooperation Forum 
at the core of its re-engagement and Yemen’s “Look 
East” policy. Then in December 2005, Sue Chung, 
the deputy governor of the Export-Import Bank of 
China (Chexim), made an announcement about the 
potential projects the PRC can finance through 
Chexim. It was then agreed that Chexim will finance 
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the building of four gas stations, a multi-purpose sea 
port, a railway and the Al-Salih Medical City with a 
total estimated value of USD 1 billion. In June 2008, 
during Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping’s trip to 
Yemen, he announced that a private Chinese 
company will invest in a 500-bed hospital in the first 
phase and proposed to upgrade Yemen-China 
relations.  The above-mentioned overlapping 
initiatives are examples of the two-way dynamics of 
Yemen-China relations and show that both parties are 
highly motivated to continue improving the bilateral 
relationship. It is a great contrast with the lesser 
initiatives exhibited by other Arab countries in their 
bilateral relations with the PRC (Xuequan, 2008). 
 
4.2  Diplomatic support and non-interference 
The PRC’s foreign policy in the Middle East 
is mostly driven by its broader national interest, i.e. to 
ensure that its economy continues to grow, to 
preserve its one party (the Communist Party of 
China) political system, to defend its sovereignty 
from external threats and interference of its domestic 
affairs, and to increase its global influence as a 
prominent global economic and political power. 
However, the PRC’s engagement with the countries 
in the Middle East is mainly driven by its 
determination to achieve energy security.  These 
wider national interests can be seen in the PRC’s 
primary objectives in the region: the enhancement of 
economic ties; to support its endeavors to achieve 
energy security; to develop friendly relations with all 
the countries in the Middle East; and to promote 
regional stability in order to support its own 
economic, security and political interests (Chaziza, 
2015). 
Although many aspects of the PRC’s foreign 
policy are continuous and have not changed, but since 
the end of the Cold War it has also changed in 
numerous important aspects. The most prominent of 
them is its evolving attitude and practice of its non-
interference policy (Chaziza, 2014). This policy was 
part of the PRC’s grand strategy that was intended to 
defend it from external interference both during and 
after the Cold War. In general, the PRC’s attitude 
with regards to intervention has never been inflexible, 
but it has evolved in keeping with the international 
and regional changes.  For example, although the 
PRC opposes the idea of intervention, it has taken 
part in several interventions in the Middle East 
(china.org.cn, February 28, 2012). For example, the 
Chinese navy has, once again, dispatched naval 
vessels to Somalia and Yemen to fight piracy in the 
Gulf of Aden. Likewise, the PRC voted for the UN 
Security Council resolution on Libya which again 
does not conform with its principle of not interfering 
with the “internal affairs” of other nations (Dean, 
2011). 
The PRC’s policy of non-interference in the 
Middle East and other regions has been implemented 
in a flexible, practical and sometimes creative 
manner. The PRC does, in fact, get involved in the 
affairs of other nations, unless it is to the detriment of 
its own economic or national interest. The Chinese 
leadership regards the Middle East as “the graveyard 
of great powers,” especially Yemen. and avoid 
getting embroiled in any crisis or conflict in the 
region. The PRC also avoid any actions that can be 
perceived as siding with any particular country or 
stakeholder (Alterman & Garver, 2008). But, since 
the demonstrations and revolts of the Arab Spring, 
the PRC’s principle of non-interference has 
encountered several geo-political challenges and it 
has been forced to slowly abandon the policy in order 
to maintain its relations with the nations in the region 
(Verhoeven, 2014). 
On the whole, the PRC’s policy of non-
interference is based on its interest to achieve an 
ultimate resolution or effective management, instead 
of intentionally trying to complicate the conflict. 
Therefore, Beijing prefers that external powers do not 
intervene in the “internal affairs” of other nations. 
However, in the event the parties failed to settle the 
conflict among themselves, then the PRC will accept 
the use of regional organizations acceptable by all the 
parties to assist in the settlement of the conflict. Only 
if the regional organization failed to solve the 
conflict, then the PRC will reluctantly agree to the 
involvement of the UN Security Council’s 
involvement in the settlement of the conflict. From 
Beijing’s perspective, the worst case scenario would 
be a unilateral extra-regional interference in intrastate 
wars (Shichor, 2013). 
One of the important aspects of the present 
Yemen-China relations is their mutual support of 
each other in the international arena and their mutual 
respect of each other’s domestic affairs. As the PRC 
have yet to reunite with Taiwan, it has always sought 
the external support of its “One-China” policy. 
Yemen has supported the “One-China” policy since 
the establishment of diplomatic relations with the 
PRC. In March 2004, President Hu Jintao said that 
the PRC and Yemen are “all-weather” friends, and 
trust and have good cooperation with each other. 
President Hu made the preceding remarks when he 
met Prime Minister Abdul Qader Bajammal of 
Yemen. He also said that the PRC and Yemen enjoy 
their friendship and their bilateral ties have grown in 
recent years. He also commended Yemen on the 
mutual trust and cooperation between them in 
international affairs.  President Hu also said that 
Yemen’s ties with the PRC is important and he will 
cooperate with Yemen to search for new areas and 
means to expand their mutually beneficial 
cooperation. He added that the mutually beneficial 
cooperation will benefit the citizen of both countries, 
He then praised the Yemeni’s achievements in 
national construction under President Salih’s 
leadership following the country’s reunification. 
(Xinhua News Agency, March 31, 2004). 
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President Hu then praised the efforts made 
by Yemen to safeguard unity and cooperation among 
the Arab countries as well as its vital role in regional 
affairs. Hu said that the PRC, a good friend of the 
Arab countries, sincerely hope that the Arab countries 
will strengthen their solidarity and cooperation to 
cope with their common tasks and challenges and 
safeguard their rights and interests. 
Prime Minister Bajammal informed Hu that 
his government and the people of Yemen thank the 
PRC for the assistance and support it has given to 
Yemen and Yemen hope to expand its cooperation 
with the PRC in the fields of economy, education, 
politics, tourism and others. Bajammal also said “The 
doors of Yemen are open to Chinese enterprises.” He 
also commended the role the PRC played to 
safeguard world peace and development, and also its 
consistent support of the Arab nations’ just cause 
(Xinhua News Agency, March 31, 2004). 
Premier Wen Jiabao said that relations 
between the PRC and Yemen have developed 
smoothly since it established diplomatic relations 48 
years ago and the areas of cooperation have been 
expanding continuously. Yemen has, over the years, 
given valuable support to the PRC on issues related to 
the “One-China” policy, human rights and others. In 
return, the PRC has reciprocated by giving its strong 
support to Yemen for its efforts to realize its grand 
cause of reunification and to safeguard its 
independence and territorial integrity. The mutual 
understanding and support between the two countries 
have helped to strengthen their political relations. 
When talking about the relations between the PRC 
and Yemen, Wen said that the Arab countries is an 
important force in the global arena. The PRC is keen 
to cooperate with the Arab countries, including 
Yemen, to deal with the common challenges and 
pursue common goals. The PRC is also committed to 
look for an early, just and reasonable resolution to the 
Middle East issue. 
Bajammal indicated that he fully agree with 
Wen’s comments on the relations between the PRC 
and Yemen as well as Wen’s proposal on the 
promotion of a comprehensive plan for the 
development of bilateral cooperation. He said that the 
Yemenis have received support and assistance from 
the Chinese people at different times in Yemen’s 
history, whether it was for its independence, 
development or reunification. He them described the 
cooperation between them as solid. Yemen is ever-
ready to work with the PRC to raise the relations 
between them to a higher level. Bajammal added that 
his country has experienced the suffering due to 
national separation and, therefore fully understands 
the position of the PRC on the Taiwan issue and fully 
supports the grand cause of China’s reunification 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 30, 2004). For 
example, when the PRC promulgated the Anti-
Secession Law in 2005, the Yemeni government 
declared, “We, in Yemen, fully support the decision 
to adopt the Anti-Secession Law, which upholds 
China’s basic policy of peaceful reunification and 
regards the non-peaceful means only as the last resort 
to stop Taiwan’s independence.” 
In 2006, on the 50th anniversary of Yemen-
China relations, Yemen’s ambassador to the PRC, 
Abdulmalek Al-Muaalemi said, “Yemen has been 
unwaveringly consistent in its support for the ‘One-
China’ policy as well as for China’s other core 
interests.”  (Al-Muaalemi, Interview, 2016 ). 
In 2004, during the agreement signing 
ceremony of the 230 million yuan economic, 
technical and educational cooperation agreement, 
Prime Minister Bajammal said that Yemen adheres to 
the “One-China” policy (Xinhua News Agency, 
March 31, 2004). In return, the PRC expressed its 
gratitude to Yemen on its adherence to the policy 
through Vice President Xi Jinping during his visit to 
Yemen in 2008 (Xuequan, 2008). 
The PRC’s non-interference doctrine is a 
powerful tool that has been used to strengthen its 
relations with the countries in Africa. The doctrine 
has been a fundamental part of the PRC’s foreign 
policy since the 1950s (Taylor, 2006). It has become 
one of the five principles of the PRC’s foreign policy 
since 1954. Upon the signing of the Panchsheel treaty 
in 1954 by the PRC and India, both countries have 
agreed to adhere to the “Five Principles of Peaceful 
Co-existence” (UN Treaty Series, 1958; 70): (i) 
Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity 
and sovereignty; (ii) Mutual non-aggression; (iii) 
Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal 
affairs; (iv) Equality and mutual benefit; and (v) 
Peaceful co-existence. 
The third principle, “mutual non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs” has been, 
for over half a century, central to the PRC’s approach 
towards international issues. Historically, the PRC 
has been observant of the sovereignty and equality 
among nations. Since the founding of the PRC in 
1949, foreign interferences with the PRC’s domestic 
affairs has been a major threat to Beijing. Therefore, 
the PRC has placed added emphasis on the 
sovereignty of all nations. Every country should be 
treated equally and none of them has the right to 
determine the domestic affairs of others (Anshan, 
2007). 
This is also applicable to human rights. In 
the West, human rights have largely emerged with the 
purpose of protecting the people from the state. As 
such, every country has the responsibility to intervene 
and protect the people irrespective of where they are. 
The PRC’s position is that sovereignty is fundamental 
since the institutions defending human rights are 
state-based mechanisms. Human rights are not a 
sufficient cause to interfere with the internal affairs of 
other countries (ibid). In 2014, Xi Jinping openly 
reaffirmed the PRC’s commitment to this doctrine 
(BBC, June 28, 2014). 
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In spite of the PRC’s apparent ideological 
background for the non-interference doctrine, 
realpolitik has also played a vital role. Siding with the 
Third World countries has allowed the PRC to reduce 
the international pressure on domestic human right 
abuses. The Western countries are in the minority in 
global organizations like the UN. This has enabled 
the PRC to garner sufficient support to fight off 
Western condemnations of the PRC’s domestic 
human rights issues (Taylor, 1998). 
 
4.3 The Arab Spring and its implication  on the 
People’s Republic of China’s policy of 2011 
The Arab Spring broke out when a young 
Tunisian street vendor, after a municipal official and 
her aides harassed and humiliated him, set himself on 
fire. After the successful rebellions in Egypt and 
Tunisia, the risk of the protest spreading has become 
increasingly real. A series of protests have taken 
place in Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, Iran, Jordan and 
Algeria. In Libya, there was a violent string of 
protests and this was met with harsh military 
repressions and has resulted in the deaths of 
thousands of Libyans and a civil war. In Yemen, in 
the wake of the protests, President Saleh announced 
that he will not take part in the next presidential 
elections. Whereas in Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah 
bin Abd al-Aziz revealed a USD 37 billion salary 
package that includes increments, unemployment 
benefits, and other social benefits. Yet, in the last part 
of 2011, the risk of the civil unrest spreading 
throughout the Middle East-North Africa (MENA) 
region remained high. The Arab Spring has produced 
new hotbeds of instability in the MENA region. 
As a result the PRC now finds itself forced 
to change attitudes and tactics and to look for new 
opportunities. Chaziza (2013) contends that the PRC 
considers the rebellions and revolts in the MENA 
region as a threat to stability, but are not new grounds 
for it to change its policy. Moreover, its military 
capabilities are nowhere near that of the US who can 
brag that it is able to guarantee the security of its 
regional allies.  That is why the PRC’s response to 
the revolutions shows that they are not interested to 
shape the political situation by taking on a reactive 
policy. The PRC’s main concerns in the MENA 
region have not changed; it is still commercial and 
not political. From the start of the Arab Spring, the 
PRC has kept to its tendency to pursue a wait-and-see 
policy. Bejing chooses not to participate actively in 
the restructuring of the Middle East.  The reason for 
such a docile policy can be summarized as a rigid 
foreign policy that shuns taking unnecessary risks. 
The PRC will make efforts to obtain its cut of the 
Arab markets and continue to engage in economic 
agreements and commercial contracts, instead of 
engaging in a zero-sum game at the cost of direct 
confrontation with the US (Chaziza, 2013).  
Furthermore, the PRC has been forced to face the fast 
changing developments and make modifications to 
enable it to keep an eye on potential repercussions at 
home and to look after its growing business interests 
in the region. However, the wave of unrest spreading 
across the MENA region will not likely be a longer-
term threat to the PRC’s interest. 
The economic instability started in Yemen 
since its unity in 1990. According to the World Bank 
Statistics (2012) the rate of unemployment in Yemen 
decreased up to 14.9% and the prices of oil also 
collapsed which contribute in the revenue of 
government up to 60% (ISSA, 2013). There was a 
great outside pressure on the president Saleh in 2009 
(IMF, 2012). The social intifada created due to 
increase in poverty level and shortages of jobs 
(Fattah, 2011). A deal appears to deseat to president 
Saleh by GCC in April, 2011 (Hatem & Carey, 2011). 
It was planned at the time when Arab spring event 
was conducted in Beijing (China) and a group of 
people in Wangfujing street outside the McDonald’s 
was assembled which was very close to Tiananmen 
Square. In one side, among the crowd the ambassador 
of America wearing leather jacket and sunglasses 
with a star and strips badges on the should appeared 
there. Lastly, any abnormal happens and police 
manage all the situation and they detain three people 
who was very close to the McDonald’s (Franceschini 
& Negro, 2014).  
A very famous scholar namely Dr. Pan 
Guang who has a deep sight on the middle-east 
affairs explained that the modern relations of china 
are segregated into four different eras. The last era of 
out of four as explained above is era of the 
premiership of Deng Xiaoping which started in 1977.  
According to Singh (2016), it is fifth era of china 
regarding its relations with other regions. Same as 
other world powers, China was amazed Arab Spring 
but it rapidly evaluated its interests based on internal 
and external level and also reviewed its impacts as 
well. The Arab Spring had great impact which was 
concerned by China at the domestic level and later on 
China found it an Islamic Spring for Chinese 
Muslims. The government of Islamist could help the 
movements by separatists in Xinjiang. On the other 
hand, China was concerned with the Arab Spring 
countries at external level due to its trade and 
investments. Today, China policy changes and it 
removes the interventions by announcing that people 
of every country should solve their problems and left 
the Arab Spring at their own (SELIM, 2013). 
While dealing with Arab Spring, China 
shows negative attitudes because of its late 
opportunities exploitation suffered by China 
diplomatic policy. The official authorities of Arab 
countries deal with the China and opposition is not 
taken into confidence and weak communication 
channels particularly in the start of crisis (Almhakbh, 
2014).  
China has witnessed a part or is affected by 
the fire, the so-called Arab Spring in 2011.  It 
becomes clear that the unrest that takes place in Hong 
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Kong is considered as the so-called Jasmine 
Revolution. The claims that are demanded are varied, 
but they are similar to what happened in Yemen and 
in the Arab states. For example, people sit-ins in 
public squares, block the streets, stop the business 
and the trend towards Hong Kong; as a result, it 
creates mess, decline, collapse, and stops of life. The 
same thing happens in Yemen; people go to Sana'a to 
have sit-ins in public squares. People block the 
streets, mess and stop of life. The external factors 
have the shape of similar mechanism, and media is 
used to encourage, support and magnify what is 
happening in Yemen. Likewise, mechanism and 
media are used to magnify the events and create 
disturbances in Hong Kong. (Al-Khawlani,  
interview,  2016). 
Regarding the same issue, Alashabi 
(Interview, 2016) opines that China is harassed from 
a question of elections and revolutions. A long time 
ago, China suppresses jasmine revolution in April 
1989.  Therefore, China is not happy on the crises of 
the Arab Spring in general for two reasons: First, 
Libya and Syria are friends of China, but when 
Chinese oil companies are affected, China leaves 
Libya and Syria. A goal is achieved since NATO has 
sought to achieve to remove Chinese oil companies 
invested from Libya. Secondly, China has been 
concerned about fear of the outbreak of 
demonstrations and sit-ins to change the political 
scene; also China does not enter in the Arab Spring. 
China is waiting for what will become the scene "let's 
see and watch what happens?" (Alashabi, Interview, 
2015).  
On the other hand, Jalal Ibrahim Fakirah 
(Interview, May 23, 2016) asserts that China respects 
the electoral experience in Yemen. It is quite evident 
as anyone will find that it is supportive of each 
political events and interactions unanimously. For 
example, China's support for Yemen is seen in all 
elections without exception, whether local, 
presidential and parliamentary. During Arab spring, 
one cannot find roles China undertaking that catches 
the eye, except the classical vision “Let's see and 
watch what happens”.  In addition, China seeks to 
ensure security and stability and try to bring together 
internal views among the parties. But the United 
States has taken clear positions, and sometimes Us 
has exasperating role for the party of the conflict; 
European countries have close positions with the 
United States as well (Fakirah, Interview,  2016). 
There are different views of China regarding 
Arab Spring, particularly about two major issues 
including threat of radical Islamism, instability and 
terrorism that are against the China’s interest in 
Middle East. These views of China are shaped into 
two major camps. One of the two camps has the 
opinion that Eastern European color revolution could 
be tied by Arab Spring. And it was seen the 
elimination earlier regimes in the countries like 
Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Ukraine. The western 
powers involved in such type of turmoil especially in 
view of western powers predictions regarding the 
china’s Jasmine revolution. In addition, revolutions as 
the second camp became very popular and it brought 
historical changes in the Arab Spring which was a 
transformation in the Middle East.  
Although there are many complexities but 
the major issue which Arab Spring is facing is related 
to the development problems which have root causes 
of negative interference of western powers.  
In this scenario, the recent extensive 
economic development of China would not be 
intimidated by any revolution because China is 
advancing successfully and it searched the ways of 
development around the world on its own. Today, 
Arab world is also trying to search out its own ways 
to bring revolution following the Islamic and 
Nasserite restoration eras.  
The outcomes of such changes will take long 
time along with many challenges which would need 
to unfold. The first challenge is within Arab world 
countries. The disintegration and schism result from 
political division such as the case of Egypt where 
liberal and political Islamic parties are in clash. The 
liberal and Islamic groups have further divisions in 
subgroups. The regional powers are the second 
challenge because they want to keep their hold and 
increase their dictation and powers in the region 
namely Qatar, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey etc. The 
intervention of international powers (Russia, United 
States and Europe) is the third challenge which Arab 
world is facing because they want to play a role in 




The above discussion of the People’s Republic of 
China’s foreign policy with regards to the Republic of 
Yemen in the period of 1990 to 2012 indicates that it 
was shaped by the competition between the PRC, the 
US and the Soviet Union. The data suggest that the 
PRC’s relations with the Republic of Yemen were 
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